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FOR EVERY WEAPON, A COUNTERWEAPON:
THE REVIVAL OF RULE 68
John P. Woods*
I. Introduction
An old military adage says that for every advance made in offensive
weaponry or tactics an advance in defensive weaponry or tactics will
eventually arise to restore the balance of power-for every weapon
there is a counterweapon.1 When Congress provided, in the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 (the Fees Act)2 as well
as in numerous other statutes,' that prevailing parties might recover
* Member of the New York Bar. Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of New
York. B.A. 1968, Fordham University. J.D. 1975, St. John's University. L.L.M.
1980, New York University School of Law. The opinions expressed in this Article
are those of the author and not those of his employer. The author would like to
express his gratitude to Linda Nealon, Esq. for her help in the research and writing
of this Article.
1. Drew Middleton, a well-known military historian, discussed, in D. MID-
DLETON, CROSSROADS OF MODERN WARFARE (1983), how the use of heavily armored
cavalry was dominant throughout much of the Middle Ages until the introduction
of the long bow as a defensive countermeasure during the Hundred Years War.
Id. at 51-52. The long bow and its successors (i.e., the rifle and machine gun)
provided an advantage to the defense which was not lost until the advent of the
tank, which was first introduced at the Battle of Cambrai in an attempt to break
the stalemate on the Western Front in World War 1. Id. at 50-61. The tank gave
back to the offense an ascendancy which may already have been lost as a result
of the introduction of missiles which can be directed at remote targets with great
accuracy. Id. at 255-65.
2. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559,
90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as
Fees Act]. For a detailed history of the legislative progress of the Fees Act, see
infra notes 113, 120 and accompanying text. The Fees Act provides in pertinent
part that:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 o.f this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20
U.S.C. 1681 et seq.] or Titlz- VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42
U.S.C. 2000d et. seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
3. See Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3037 (1985). The Appendix to the
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan lists statutes that provide for attorney's fees
as part of the costs awarded. Id.; see, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, Pub.
L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E),
(F) (Supp. 1985)); Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (1974)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(2)(B), 552a(g)(4)(B) (1982)); Government
in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i) (1982)).
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a reasonable attorney's fee as part of "the costs," 4 it gave to plaintiffs
a major advantage. Not only did the prospect of acquiring attorney's
fees make counsel more readily available to them, but it also greatly
increased the amount the defendant might haye' to pay by making
recoyerable the plaintiff's attorney's fees5 as well as a compensatory
damage award.' The Supreme Court, in Marek v. Chesny,' to some
extent restored the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants.
The Marek case held that ant offer of judgment' made pursuant to
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 68),' which
is not ultimately exceeded by a court judgment, serves to cut off the
4. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
5. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Attorney's fees in civil rights cases can far exceed the plaintiff's recovery. See,
e.g., McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112* (2d Cir. 1983) (refusal to reduce $50,000
attorney fee 'award on ground .that pl.aintiff was awarded only $1 in nominal
damages was not in error); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1206 n.12"(8th Cir.
198!) (counsel recovered eighteen times Ithe amount of back pay recov'eied by
plaintiff); Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 649 F.2d 1084 (th Cir. 1981)
($24,514.70 recovery for attorney and $8,654.16 for the client); Copeland v. Marshall,
641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Title VII plaintiffs recovered $33,000 in back pay
while their lawyers received $160,000 in fees); Spano v. Simendinger, 613 F. Supp.
124 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (awarding $62,078.21 in attorney's fees in case with $2,500
recovery).
For a discussion of the policy considerations behind the Fees Act, see infra notes
185-87 and accompanying text.
6. Rivera v. City of Riverside, 763 F.2d 1580 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming award
of $245,456.25 as attorney's fees on darmage award of $33,350), stayed, 106 S.
Ct. 5, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 244 (1985). The court held that there need not be
a relationship between the amount of damages awarded to the prevailing party and
the amount of attorney's fees awarded. Id. at 1583.
7. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985).
8. An offer of judgment is an offer made by a defending party more than
10 days before trial to allow a judgment to be taken against him to the extent
specified in the offer. FED. R. Civ. P. 68; see infra note 9 and accompanying
text.
9. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 states:
Offer of Judgment.
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow
judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or to the
effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days
after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that
the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of
acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk
shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn
and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine
costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable
than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making
of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not
preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to another
[Vol. XIV
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plaintiff's right to recover those attorney's fees which accrue after
the date of the offer.10
The Marek decision seems likely to make Rule 68 a major litigation
tool" after more than forty-five years of relative neglect.' 2 A com-
bination of factors, including the burgeoning size of fee awards in
civil rights cases,' 3 are responsible for the revival of Rule 68. The
most critical of these factors was Congress' decision to include fees
"as part of the costs" recoverable under the Fees Act. 4 This Article
will examine Rule 68 and relevant cases to determine why the Rule
has come into such sudden prominence. Particular attention will be
paid to the implications of Rule 68 and the Marek case for fee
awards in civil cases.' 5 Finally, this Article will examine proposed
revisions to Rule 68 and will conclude that retaining the present
version of Rule 68, with some minor technical changes, would best
benefit the public interest because it would encourage speedy and
fair settlement awards.' 6
11. The Mechanics of Rule 68
Rule 68 has been a part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) since their enactment in 1938, and has changed little since
then. 7 The Rule reflects what was then a new development in federal
has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount
or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further proceedings,
the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment, which shall
have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within
a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of
hearings to determine the amount or extent of liability.
FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
II. The clarification of Rule 68 by the Supreme Court in the Marek decision
will make Rule 68 a more visible and viable option for litigants. Marek v. Chesny,
105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985). See infra notes 218-305 for a discussion of the Marek
decision.
12. For a discussion of the reasons behind Rule 68's apparent disuse, see infra
notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Rivera v. City of Riverside, 679 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1982) (fee
award of $243,343.75); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (fee
award of $160,000); Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 584 F. Supp. 849 (N.D.
Ill. 1984) (fee award of $255,795.25).
14. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) ("the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs").
15. See infra notes 120-27, 218-305 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 306-25 and accompanying text.
17. Since its enactment in 1938 as part of the original Federal Rules, Rule 68
has been amended on only two occasions, in 1946 and 1966, for minor technical
1986]
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practice: the denial of costs to parties who continued litigation after
refusing a settlement offer and who recovered a court judgment in
an amount less than the offer." This concept was borrowed from
several state statutes.' 9 Similar provisions have since been enacted
alterations. See J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, & K. SINCLAIR, 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
68.01 (2d ed. 1985). However, within the last two years, extensive and controversial
changes in Rule 68 have been proposed. One set of changes was proposed in 1983
and encountered major opposition. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments,
98 F.R.D. 337, 353, 361-67 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Proposed Revision].
See generally Note, The Impact of Proposed Rule 68 on Civil Rights Litigation,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 719 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Impact of Proposed Rule 68].
A second Proposed Revision was put forth in 1984 and is currently under con-
sideration. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, 102 F.R.D. 432-37 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as 1984 Proposed Revision]. It remains to be seen whether any
changes will actually be enacted in view of the Court's decision in Marek v. Chesny.
See infra notes 306-25 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of these
proposals.
18. It should be noted, however, that courts can in their discretion deny costs
to the prevailing party. Crutcher v. Joyce, 146 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1945) (court
sustained decision to deny costs to a litigant who continued to litigate after refusing
a settlement and recovered essentially the same amount as settlement offer). The
court made its decision by drawing upon its equitable powers. Id. at 519-20. The
court so held without reference to Rule 68. Id.
19. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES WITH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES,
CLEVELAND, OHIO 337 (1938). The 1938 Advisory Committee Notes to the original
version of the Rule merely cited three state statutes as illustrations of the operation
of the Rule. Id. However, Robert G. Dodge, one of the members of the Advisory
Committee indicated at a symposium on the new Rules that the Rule was based
on "statutes which are widely prevalent in the states." Id.
Statutes from Minnesota, Montana and New York mandated the imposition of
costs on a plaintiff who rejected settlement offers and failed to obtain a judgment
more favorable than the offer. Section 9323 of title 2 of the Minnesota statute
provided:
At least ten days before the term at which any civil action shall stand
for trial the defendant may serve on the adverse party an offer to allow
judgment to be taken against him for the sum, or property, or to the
effect therein specified, with costs then accrued. If within ten days
thereafter such party shall give notice that the offer is accepted, he may
file the same, with proof of such notice, and thereupon the clerk shall
enter judgment accordingly. Otherwise the offer shall be deemed with-
drawn, and evidence thereof shall not be given; and if a more favorable
judgment be not recovered no costs shall be allowed, but those of the
defendant shall be taxed in his favor.
2 MINN. STAT. § 9323 (Mason 1927); reprinted in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August,
450 U.S. 346, 357 n.19. (1981).
Section 9770 of title 4 of the Montana Revised Code Annotated provided:
The defendant may, at any time before the trial or judgment, serve upon
the plaintiff an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the
sum or property, or to the effect therein specified. If the plaintiff accept
the offer, and give notice thereof within five days, he may file the offer,
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in states with procedural codes based upon the FRCP 0 and in states
with proof of notice of acceptance, and the clerk must thereupon enter
judgment accordingly. If the notice of acceptance be not given, the offer
is to be deemed withdrawn, and cannot be given in evidence upon the
trial; and if the plaintiff fail to obtain a more favorable judgment, he
cannot recover costs, but he must pay the defendant's costs from the
time of the offer.
4 MONT. REVISED CODE ANN. § 9770 (1935), reprinted in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
August, 450 U.S. at 357 n.19.
Section 177 of New York's Civil Practice Law provided:
Before the trial, the defendant may serve upon plaintiff's attorney a
written offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for a sum, or
property, or to the effect, therein specified, with costs. If there be two
or more defendants, and the action can be severed, a like offer may be
made by one or more defendants against whom a separate judgment
may be taken. If the plaintiff, within ten days thereafter, serve upon
the defendant's attorney a written notice that he accepts the offer, he
may file the summons, complaint, and offer, with proof of acceptance,
and thereupon the clerk must enter judgment accordingly. If notice of
acceptance be not thus given, the offer cannot be given in evidence upon
the trial; but, if the plaintiff fail to obtain a more favorable judgment,
he cannot recover costs from the time of the offer, but must pay costs
from that time.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 177 (Cahill 1937); reprinted in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
August, 450 U.S. at 357 n.19.
"All three states had other provisions, similar to Rule 54(d), providing for the
recovery of costs by a prevailing party." Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450
U.S. at 357-58 (footnote omitted).
"Therefore, the only purpose served by these state offer-of-judgment rules was
to penalize prevailing plaintiffs who had rejected reasonable settlement offers without
good cause." Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
In each of these States, the general statute providing for recovery of
costs by prevailing defendants was, unlike Rule 54(d), mandatory. See
4 MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9787-88 (1935); 2 MINN. STAT. § 9471
(Mason 1927); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 1470-75 (Cahill 1937). Inasmuch
as those statutes did not give trial judges discretion to deny costs to
prevailing defendants, the state antecedents of Rule 68 did not perform
any cost-shifting function in cases in which the defendant prevailed. In
those States-as is true under Rule 68-a sham settlement offer had no
practical consequences: it left the parties in the same position as if no
offer had been made.
Id. at 358 n.21.
Other states have or had similar rules.
See, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 1980); Yeager v. Campion, 70
Colo. 183, 197 P. 898, 898-99 (1921); Wordin v. Bemis, 33 Conn. 216
(1866); Prather v. Pritchard, 26 Ind. 65 (1866); West v. Springfield Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 105 Kan. 414, 185 P. 12 (1919); Wacshmuth v.
Orient Ins. Co., 49.Neb. 590, 68 N.W. 935 (1896); Herring-Hall-Marvin
Safe Co. v. Balliet, 44 Nev. 94, 190 P, 76 (1920); Hammond v. Northern
Pacific R. Co., 23 Or. 157, 31 P. 299 (1892); Sioux Falls Adjustment
Co. v. Penn Soo Oil Co., 53 S.D. 77, 220 N.W. 146 (1928); Newton
v. Allis, 16 Wis. 210 (1862).
Id. at 358 n.22.
20. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 68; D.C. R. Civ. P. 68; Ky. REV. STAT. VOL. 17,
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with their own distinctive codes." The Rule was approved, apparently
without debate,22 and with little discussion by either the Advisory
Committee23 or contemporaneous commentators.24
A. Making a Rule 68 Offer
The mechanics of making a Rule 68 offer of judgment are simple
but must be followed carefully. An offer of judgment is an offer
of money, property or other relief made by the party defending a
claim.25 If accepted, the offer is filed by the court as the judgment
in the case.26 While essentially a defendant's procedural device, Rule
68 is available to any party defending against a claim. 7 The offer
Rule 68; Miss. R. Civ. P. 68; MONT. R. Civ. P. 68; NEV. R. Civ. P. 68; N.M.
R. Civ. P. 68; N.D. Civ. P. Rule 68(a).
21. See, e.g., ALASKA Civ. R. P. 27-1501; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West
1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-195 (West 1983); FLA. R. CIrv. P. 1442; IND.
CODE ANN. TR 68 (Burns 1983); Mo. REV. STAT. § 514.400 (1952); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-906 (1979); N.J. RULE 4:58-1; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 3221 (McKinney
1982); OHIO R. Civ. PROC. 68 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 807.01[1], [3] (West 1977).
22. No discussion of Rule 68 appears in the debates of the Advisory Committee.
See ABA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 337-38; NOTES OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE H.R. Doc. No. 558, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1937); H.R. REP. No.
2743, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938).
23. The Advisory Committee's sole comment on Rule 68 was merely a reference
to the three state statutes upon which the concept behind Rule 68 was based (i.e.,
Minnesota, Montana and New York). See FED. R. Civ. P. 68 Advisory Committee
note, 28 U.S.C. at 637 (1983); supra note 19.
24. A much cited contemporary article on the new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure merely states by way of commentary:
This provision [Rule 68], in a case involving some doubt, might strongly
influence the plaintiff to accept the defendant's offer; or, if the offer
is not accepted, it, of course, relieves the offering defendant of the
burden of future costs, thereby constituting an inducement to the making
of such offers.
Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 304, n.195
(1939).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
26. Id.
27. Maguire v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 9 F.R.D. 240, 242 (W.D. La. 1949),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 181 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1950), suggests that an
offer can only be made by a defendant, but all the commentators agree that Rule
68 should be available to anyone in the posture of a defendant whether through
a cross-claim, a counterclaim or a third party action. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
12 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3001, at 56 n.7 (1973); see also FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
INSTITUTE 337 (Cleveland 1938) (comments of Mr. Robert Dodge, member of original
Advisory Committee). For the sake of consistency, this Article will refer to offers
as being made by defendants.
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must be made more than ten days "before the trial begins." 28 Service
of the offer is made upon plaintiff's counsel in the same manner
as the service of other papers in the suit.29 Unlike the normal federal
practice in which court papers are filed with the court, an offer
should not be filed until it is required in a proceeding to determine
costs.30 However, premature filing will not render the offer inef-
fective, but will merely result in the offer being stricken from the
court file."
28. This provision is not as simple as it reads. Rule 68 was amended in 1946,
in response to a 'decision in Cover v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 136 F.2d 374 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 749 (1943), to provide that where liability has been
determined in a separate proceeding, the defendant can make an offer of judgment
up to ten days before the damages trial. See FED. k. Cv. P. 68 Advisory Committee
note, 28 U.S.C. at 637 (1983). There is, however, a question as to what is'meant
by the phrase "date the trial begins." In Cruz v. Pacific Am. Ins. Corp., 337
F.2d 746 (9th Cir: 1964), the Ninth Circuit read that phrase to mean ten days
before the trial is set, concluding that "it must mean that to make it an effective
rule." Id. at 748.
However, in Greenwood v. Stevenson, 88 F.R.D. 225 (D.R.! 1980), the court
found that for purposes of the ten-day rule the trial began when the "trial judge
calls the proceedings to order and actually commences to hear the case," rather
than when the jury is selected or the trial date is set. Id. at 229.
The Greenwood case better supports the purposes of Rule 68 and better recognizes
the current realities of the judicial system. Trial dates are "set" and come and
go regularly without the actual trial ever commencing. The purpose of Rule 68 is
to encourage settlement. Therefore, offers should be allowed until the last moment
rather than foreclosed because the court has "set" a trial date-possibly years
before the case actually goes to trial. See Barnicle, Offers of Judgment Under
Federal Rule 68: The Impact of Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 1982 TRIAL LAW.
GUIDE 139, 142-43 '[hereinafter cited as Barnicle].
29. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), in essence, provides for service "upon
the attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court." FED.
R. Civ. P. 5(b). The Eleventh Circuit has held that "[tlhere is nothing under Rule
68 which permits an offer of judgment, with the attendant sanctions against the
successful plaintiff to be served upon the opposing party, rather than the party's
counsel of record." Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 681 F.2d 1259, 1268
(llth Cir. 1982). The plaintiff in Pettway had also obtained permission from the
district court not only to serve the offer upon the class members themselves, but
to include a sales pitch with the offer. Id. The Eleventh Circuit found this course
of action to be improper. Id.
30. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 states, in part: "a party defending against
a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against him . . . ." FED. R. Crv. P. 68; see infra note 31 and accompanying text.
31. Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (D. Colo. 1978) (plaintiff's motion
to strike the offer because it was filed with court held to be only a procedural
error which could be remedied); Tansey v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.,
97 F. Supp. 458, 459 (D.D.C. 1949) ("[u]nder Rule 68 the pleading filed as an
offer of judgment is not a part of the record and having been filed as such ...
it must be stricken"); Nabors v. Texas Co., 32 F. Supp. 91, 92 (W.D. La. 1940)
(offer filed with the court should be stricken); see 7 J. Moore, MOORE's FEDERAL
1986]
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The offer must be for a definite sum32 or for other relief 3 which
can readily be entered as a judgment and must include "costs then
accrued. 34 The defendant must hold open the offer for ten days;35
PRACTICE 68.04 (2d ed. 1985).
In Boorstein v. City of New York, one district court permitted a plaintiff to
bring a motion to strike a Rule 68 offer as being vague, even though that offer
had never been (and should not have been) filed with the court. 107 F.R.D. 31
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). Although conceding that there was "little precedent for motions
to strike Rule 68 offers because of their substance," id. at 34, the court nonetheless
entertained the motion on the authority of Klawes v. Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co., 572 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Wis. 1983). However, the Klawes court had stricken
an offer by a plaintiff made under a provision of Wisconsin state law rather than
Rule 68, thus providing dubious authority for allowing a motion to strike something
not actually part of the court file. Therefore, the Boorstein holding seems to be
an unwise invitation to further litigation.
32. Tansey v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 458, 459
(D.D.C. 1949) ("defendant's offer of judgment does not specify a definite sum to
be entered as judgment which plaintiff can either accept or reject and therefore
the offer will not prevent consideration by the court of plaintiff's costs hereinafter
incurred"); see Barnicle, supra note 28, at 146-47. But see Waters v. Heublein,
Inc. 485 F. Supp. 110, 115-16 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (offer of $10,000 "less statutory
wage deductions" for backpay in Equal Pay Act case did not render offer indefinite).
33. The language of Rule 68 allows an offer for money or property or "to
the effect specified in [the] offer." FED. R. Civ. P. 68. Rule 68 thus clearly
contemplates that non-monetary offers may be made. As discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 41-64, if the offer is rejected, difficulties may arise in deter-
mining whether the offer has been exceeded by the non-monetary relief ultimately
attained. See Barnicle, supra note 28, at 149.
34. In Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 (D. Colo. 1978), the court
found ineffective a Rule 68 offer which excluded attorney's fees from the "costs
incurred." The court found that attorney's fees were part of the costs in that
context and that an offeror cannot "choose which accrued costs he is willing to
pay." Id. at 1260.
In Marek, the Supreme Court established a simple test for the validity of the
form of the offer. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3015-16 (1985). The Court
stated that the offer need not recite that costs are included, nor specify a set
amount for costs, or even refer to costs. Id. It will be effective so long as the
offer does not purport to exclude costs. Id.; see infra notes 233-42 and accompanying
text.
Despite this clear rule from the Supreme Court, a district court has since found
that a Rule 68 offer for $5,000 inclusive of attorney's fees "with costs now accrued"
was invalid because its terms were vague as to whether the $5,000 included attorney's
fees. Boorstein v. City of New York, 107 F.R.D. 31, 33-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The
court, however, found that the invalidity had been cleared up by telephone con-
versations in which the defendant's counsel had explained the meaning of the terms
of the offer. Id. at 35. The curious result in Boorstein is impossible to reconcile
with Marek because under either interpretation of the offer it did not seek to
exclude costs, and was thus valid.
35. While the Rule does not explicitly state that it is irrevocable for ten days,
it does state that if accepted within ten days and filed with the clerk, that the
clerk "shall" enter judgment. This has been interpreted as a requirement that the
offer be held open for 10 days. See C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
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this period may not be extended without the plaintiff's permission.3 6
If the plaintiff elects to accept the offer, he must give written notice
of his acceptance within ten days of service of the offer. Either
party may then file the notice with the clerk, who will enter the
judgment as set forth in the offer. 7 If the offer is not accepted
within ten days, it is deemed rejected and will not be admissible in
any further proceeding, except one which fixes costs.38 Having made
an offer which has been rejected, the defendant is free to make
other offers,3 9 presumably for a greater sum, up to ten days before
trial.4 0
B. Determining Whether The Offer Has Been Exceeded by a
Court Judgment
Rule 68 states that "if the judgment finally obtained by the offeree
is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs
AND PROCEDURE § 3004 (1973); Barnicle, supra note 28, at 147-48; Udall, May
Offers of Judgment Under Rule 68 Be Revoked Before Acceptance? 19 F.R.D.
401 (1957); FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 299 (New York 1938).
Another curious result in Boorstein v. City of New York was that the district
court allowed a challenge to an offer to be made after the ten day period had
expired. 107 F.R.D. at 34; see supra notes 17, 20 and accompanying text.
36. Staffend v. Lake Cent. Airlines, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 218, 220 (N.D. Ohio 1969)
("[i]f this Court were to extend the period in which the plaintiffs may accept thedefendants' [offer], the usefulness of Rule 68 would be substantially destroyed").
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
38. This specific provision was added in 1946. See J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & K.
SINCLAIR, 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 68.01 (2d ed. 1985); see also Federal
Rule of Evidence 408 which provides that evidence of an offer to compromise a
claim is not admissible "to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim .. .
FED R. EVID. 408.
39. The rule was amended in 1946 to specifically provide that "[tlhe fact that
an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer." FED.
R. Civ. P. 68. The Committee note states:
It is implicit, however, that as long as the case continues-whether there
be a first, second or third trial-and the defendant makes no further
offer, his first and only offer will operate to save him the costs from
the time of that offer if the plaintiff ultimately obtains a judgment less
than the sum offered.
FED. R. Civ. P. 68; Notes of the Advisory Committee on 1946 Amendments to
Rules. See J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & K. SINCLAIR, 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
68.06 (2d ed. 1985); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 12 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3004 (1st ed. 1973).
40. The Rule states that "[a]t any time more than 10 days before the trial
begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an
offer to allow judgment to be taken against him .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 68
(emphasis added).
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incurred after the making of the offer." '4' Since the Rule allows the
offeror to make an offer "for the money or property or to the
effect specified," ' 42 it clearly contemplates that offers will be made
for non-monetary relief 43, as well as monetary relief. Thus, there are
at least three different types of offers which can be made on the
plaintiff's liability claim: (1) an offer of money alone; (2) an offer
of non-monetary relief; or (3) a "mixed offer" of both non-monetary
and monetary relief.
While in many cases it will be simple to determine whether the
offer is greater than the judgment by merely looking at the two,
that will not always be the case. For example, where the relief
offered is not readily quantified in dollars, obvious difficulties arise
in the comparison between the offer and the monetary judgment.44
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
42. The Rule states that the offeror may make an offer of judgment against
him of "money or property or to the effect specified in his offer." FED. R. Civ.
P. 68 (emphasis added).
43. Examples of non-monetary relief include injunctions and demands for specific
performance.
44. Difficulties arise even in the situation where both the offer and judgment
are in the form of money. For example, since the offer must include the costs
then accrued, it is unclear whether the judgment must be increased by the accrued
costs amount so as to create a true comparison. A valid argument can be made
that the attorney's fee component of the costs awarded is actually recovered by
the attorney rather than the client, and thus should not be included in the judgment
for comparison purposes. See James v. Home Constr. Co. of Mobile, Inc., 689
F.2d 1357, 1358 (l1th Cir. 1982) ("it is the attorney who is entitled to fee awards
in a [Truth-in-Lending Act] case, not the client"); Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D.
447, 452 (D. 111. 1978) (fact that consent decree, where plaintiffs were prevailing
parties, did not mention subject of attorney's fees did not require vacation of
decree or grant of motion to strike motion for attorney's fees and costs under
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976). However, several courts have
found that the fee award is technically made to the plaintiff. See Brown v. General
Motors Corp., 722 F.2d 1009, 1011 (2d Cir. 1983) (under Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, prevailing party, rather than lawyer, is entitled to
attorney's fees); Oguachuba v. INS, 706 F.2d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1983) (interpreting
similar language in Equal Access to Justice Act). The trend of the law in those
cases where comparisons are made has been to add the fees and costs to the
plaintiff's compensatory recovery to arrive at the total figure for comparison
purposes. Two courts have suggested in dicta that this approach should be followed.
See Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 105
S. Ct. 3012 (1985); Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clarke, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 564 (N.D.
111. 1976). Another court simply totalled the plaintiff's merits recovery, costs and
fees to arrive at a figure for comparison purposes. Quinto v. Legal Times, Inc.,
511 F. Supp. 579, 582 (D.D.C. 1981).
This would mean that in evaluating the appropriate figure for comparison with
the offer, the court must first go through the complicated process of calculating
the amount of the plaintiff's fees accrued before the date of the offer. See infra
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1. Non-Monetary Relief
Three recent cases have compared the value of the non-monetary
relief ultimately obtained with that which was included in a Rule
68 offer. In Garrity v. Sununu,45 the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reviewed the fee award in a successful civil rights class action
brought by residents of a New Hampshire state institution for the
mentally retarded, challenging conditions at the institution. Defend-
ants made a Rule 68 offer consisting of a proposed court order
which would have provided the residents with non-monetary relief
in the form of improved services. 46 The plaintiffs, after rejecting
the offer, prevailed at trial and obtained a decree for improved
services different from that offered by the defendant. 47 Defendants
subsequently moved under Rule 68 for an award of fees in their
favor.4 8 The district court denied the award of fees and further
found that the judgment had exceeded the defendant's offer.4 9
The First Circuit, affirming the district court's decision, stated
that great deference should be given to the district court's deter-
mination as to whether the offer had been exceeded ° because the
district court should best be able to compare the relative merits of
an early consent settlement with the actual relief obtained.5 In
addition, the court stated that although the offer contained vague
promises, the district court was entitled to construe the ambiguities
in the offer against the offeror, so as to prevent the offeree from
being pressured into accepting what might turn out to be an un-
notes 131-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the process by which the
court calculates the amount of fees.
45. 752 F.2d 727 (1st Cir. 1984). Applying the clearly erroneous standard, the
court found that the district court's determination that the relief obtained in a
civil rights class action was not less favorable than the defendants' pretrial offer,
and, therefore, that the defendants were not entitled to post-offer costs, including
attorney's fees. Id. at 730-33.
46. Id. at 729. Even so, the circuit court notes that the district court was
skeptical that the relief offered by the defendants would ensure that residents of
the facility could receive services in accordance with federal Standards for Inter-
mediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded under 42 C.F.R. §§ 442.400-
442.516 (1979); 752 F.2d at 732.
47. The court ordered services including education, medical services, and desirable
housing facilities pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978); the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and pursuant to state law. Garrity v.
Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 239-44 (D.N.H. 1981).
48. Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 730-31 (1st Cir. 1984).
49. Id. at 731.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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favorable offer.12 Thus, unless a clear error is found in the district
court's assessment of the defendant's proposal, the circuit court
should defer to the district court's determination. 3
Similarly, in Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota
v. Olson,54 and in Lightfoot v. Walker" the defendants made offers
for procedures to upgrade care, which were found to be less favorable
than the relief finally obtained. Each district court compared the
court orders and the judgments obtained. In Olson, the district court
noted that the offer failed to meet the patient's needs in several
"critical areas," including pharmaceutical and punishment reform.16
Similarly, in Lightfoot, the court found that the offers did not
include provisions which the court determined were "absolutely es-
sential." The courts concluded that plaintiffs obtained more relief
under the court judgment,57 thereby eliminating the need to apply
Rule 68.
These three cases illustrate not only the difficulty of drafting a
Rule 68 offer in these situations, but that it is possible to make
meaningful comparisons between an offer and a court's decree, even
where the offer and the relief granted are non-monetary. 8 A list
52. Id. at 732-33.
53. Id. at 733.
54. 561 F. Supp. 495 (D.N.D. 1982), modified on other grounds, 713 F.2d
1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
55. 619 F. Supp. 1481 (S.D. 111. 1985). The Lightfoot analysis is somewhat
more perfunctory than the other cases. In Lightfoot, the district court ruled on
the fee application in a class action which had been bitterly fought for twelve years
based on the conditions of medical care in a state prison. Id. at 1484. Defendants
opposed an award of attorney's fees based upon three earlier offers of judgment
under Rule 68. Id. at 1485. The court, while recognizing the "inherent difficulty
in comparing settlement proposals in cases such as this," had no difficulty in
finding that the offers had been surpassed. Id. The court specifically compared
the degree of success obtained and noted that some of the provisions that the
court viewed as "absolutely essential" had not been included in any of the offers.
Id. at 1485-86. Like the Garrity court, the court in Lightfoot found vague offers
of relief contingent upon "trust" to be of less value than the specific court-ordered
relief obtained. Id. at 1485.
56. Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 498.
57. In Olson, the court noted that although the offer contained "infinite detail,"
it also contained caveats which made its dictates "precatory" rather than "man-
datory." Id. Beyond general criticisms, the court compared specific provisions of
the offer and the court order to reach its conclusion. For example, the court noted
that the order required immediate correction of overcrowding, whereas the offer
of judgment provided for a certain number of community placements by the year
1988. Id.
58. One case, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 691 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1982),
illustrates a clever way to use Rule 68 to shift costs but does not tell how to
compare an offer with the relief obtained. In Liberty Mutual, the plaintiff sought
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of criteria, for comparison purposes, might include: (1) the scope
of the relief of the offer and of the judgment; (2) the number of
people affected by the offer and the judgment respectively; (3) the
specific items of relief contained in the offer and the judgment; (4)
the immediacy of the relief offered and that obtained; (5) the
specificity or vagueness of the offer as compared with the relief
ultimately obtained; (6) the mechanics of supervision of the relief
in the proposal; (7) the extent to which the terms of the offer are
mandatory rather than optional or based upon "good faith;" and
(8) the time between the offer and the ultimate judgment.59
2. Mixed Offers
The most complicated comparison involves what might be called
the "mixed offer:" the defendant offers certain specific non-monetary
relief as well as a specific sum of monetary relief.60 To assess such
an offer, the court should go through the process used for non-
monetary awards for each element of the offer, both the monetary
and non-monetary, to determine whether the relief offered in each
category exceeded that which was obtained. If, after applying such
a comparison, the court finds that the plaintiff's recovery on both
elements exceeds the offer, it need look no further. If, however,
injunctive relief from the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission
to prevent certain investigations and disclosures. Id. at 439. The defendant offered
to have judgment entered against it enjoining it from disclosure of information
made confidential by law. Id. at 439. The plaintiff rejected that offer aWd both
sides then moved for summary judgment with the defendant in effect moving for
summary judgment against itself on the terms of the Rule 68 offer. Id. at 442.
The court ultimately entered judgment on the terms of the defendant's proposed
order and the defendant recovered from the plaintiff his costs accrued after the
offer. Id. at 442. Thus, Liberty Mutual shows how Rule 68 can be used inventively
in a case involving a request for injunctive relief but does not-tell how to measure
that relief.
For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in making these types of comparisons,
see Barnacle, supra note 28, at 149-51; Note, The "Offer of Judgment" Rule in
Employment Discrimination Actions: A Fundamental Incompatibility, 10 GOLDEN
GATE L. REV. 963 (1980) [hereinafter cited as A Fundamental Incompatibility].
Nevertheless, it is feasible that, in some situations, the offer and the judgment
will be so different that a meaningful comparison will not be possible. In those
situations, fairness suggests that the court judgment be found to exceed the offer.
59. An offer which immediately provides most of the relief sought might be
more favorable than a judgment granting somewhat greater relief years later.
60. In Mr. Hanger, Inc. v. Cut Rate Plastic Hangers, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 607
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), a patent infringement case, the defendants had made a Rule 68
offer of $25 and agreed to discontinue the alleged infringement. Id. at 608; see
also Gamlen Chemical Co. v. Dacar Chemical Products Co., 5 F.R.D. 215 (W.D.
Pa. 1946) (offer of money plus injunction in copyright infringement case).
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the court finds that one element exceeds the offer but the other
does not, the court would have to compare the "total package" of
the offer and the judgment to determine whether the judgment
exceeds the offer.
The difficulties in making comparisons regarding non-monetary
and mixed offers have led commentators to suggest that use of Rule
68 be prohibited in cases where injunctive relief is requested. 6' Indeed,
the Advisory Committee, charged with revising Rule 68, has proposed
that the Rule be limited to cases demanding monetary relief.62 Such
a limitation would be unsatisfactory, however, since the Rule's pur-
pose of encouraging settlement is as applicable to cases requesting
non-monetary relief as it is to cases seeking money damages only. 63
The better solution would be to develop standards for making the
difficult comparisons, through either case law or statutory revision.64
Presently, in situations where it is impossible to compare the offer
and the recovery obtained, fairness would suggest that Rule 68 not
apply in order that plaintiffs be adequately protected.
C. Penalties Under Rule 68
The penalty portion of Rule 68 encourages settlement because it
threatens to take from the victor some of the fruits of his victory65
if the victor has previously rejected an offer. The Rule provides
that if the judgment finally obtained by the plaintiff is less than
the offer, the plaintiff must pay the costs accrued by both the
61. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
62. See 1983 Proposed Revision, supra note 17. One commentator has suggested
that Rule 68 should not apply to employment discrimination cases brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e-17); A Fundamental Incompatibility, supra
note 58.
63. See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 68's
applicability to both of these situations.
-A plaintiff confronted with the complexity of assessing mixed offers and offers
of non-monetary relief can reject such an offer with more confidence than he can
a money offer, simply because there is a better chance that the difficulty of the
comparison will force the court to find that the offer was exceeded. However,
even in these difficult situations, the availability of Rule 68 will often be a positive
factor in litigation because it will force both parties to "concentrate their minds"
as early as possible in the litigation on what will be an acceptable offer.
64. Certain principles to be employed in comparing non-monetary offers can
be extracted from the decisions in Garrity, Olson and Lightfoot. See supra notes
45-63 and accompanying text.
65. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981). For a discussion
of the penalty provision contained in Rule 68, see infra note 66 and accompanying
text.
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plaintiff and the defendant after the date of the offer. 66 The Rule
thus negates the presumption embodied in Rule 54(d) 67 that "costs
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs." ' 68 Therefore, a prevailing plaintiff who rejects an
offer will not only be precluded from recovering his own costs, but
will be required to pay the costs accrued by his adversary after the
offer was made. 69 Depending upon the relative amounts of his
recovery and the costs he must pay, the plaintiff may discover that
66. Rule 68 states that "[i]f the judgment finally obtained by the offeree 'is
not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after
the making of. the offer." FED. R. Civ. P. 68. This has been construed to mean
that the offeree does not recover his own costs accrued after the date of the offer
and must pay those accrued by the offeror. See supra note 65; infra notes 67, 92-
96 and accompanying text.
67. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides a presumption in favor of
the prevailing party. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
68. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) states:
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of
the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course
to the-prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; but costs igainst
the United States, its officers, and agencies shall be imposed only to the
extent permitted by law. Costs may be taxed by the clerk on one day's
notice. On motion served within 5 days thereafter, the action of the
clerk may be reviewed by the court.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
The presumption in favor of the prevailing party is subject to the discretion of
the court to deny costs. See 6 J. MOORE, J. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.70[5] (2d ed. 1985). That discretion will be upheld on
review in the absence of an "abuse." Id.; see also In re Air Crash Disaster at
John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975, 687 F.2d 626, 629 (2d Cir. 1982)
(quoting Mid-Hudson Legal Serv., Inc. v. G. & U., Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 38 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1978)); Bartell, Taxation of Costs and Awards of Expenses in Federal Court,
101 F.R.D. 553, 559-61 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Costs and Awards].
For purposes of clarity, the term "taxable costs" will be used throughout this
Article to refer to expenses such as those discussed infra notes 75-80.
69. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 691 F.2d 438, 442 (9th Cir. 1982);
Quintel Corp., N.'. v. Citibank, N.A., 606 F. Supp. 898, 915-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(Rule 68 shifts taxable costs but not attorney's fees); Lyons v. Cunningham, 583
F. Supp. 1147, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Mr. Hanger, Inc. v. Cut Rate Plastic Hangers,
Inc., 63 F.R.D. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). The Lyons case represents a good example
of how this works. In Lyons the plaintiffs sought to recover $4,500 in deposition
and transcript costs. 583 F. Supp. at 1150-51. Not only were they barred from
recovering those costs, but they had to pay approximately $450 of the defendant's
costs. The total amount which the plaintiff lost was $5,000 out of a recovery of
$24,000. Id. at 1156. But see Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 110, 117
(N.D. Cal. 1979). In Waters the defendants failed to meet the requirements of
Title VII for attorney's fees and expert witness fees. Id. Defendants argued that
Rule 68 necessitated the awarding of these fees since it was plaintiff's rejection of
their reasonable settlement offer that caused these costs to be incurred. Id. The
court, however, rejected this argument. Id.
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Rule 68 has taken away not only some of the fruits of victory but
the entire victory.
The term "costs" is frequently used imprecisely; it has a different
meaning in different contexts.7 0 Traditionally, "costs" are the par-
ticular expenses which are made recoverable by statute,7 and awarded
under Rule 54(d)72 or a similar local rule." These costs, commonly
referred to as "taxable costs,'' 74 include items such as witness fees,7 5
70. For example, the costs a plaintiff accrues in bringing a lawsuit might include
time lost from work and inconvenience, but these costs are not recoverable under
the Federal Rules.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Section 1920, entitled: "Taxation of costs," does
not provide a list of items which are recoverable, but does provide:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs
the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained
for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 192.3 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of inter-
preters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation
services under section 1828 of this title.
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the
judgment or decree.
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982).
Section 1923 contains a list of docket fees, most of which have become nominal
with the passage of time. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1982).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d); see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., CIVIL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR THE
SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF NEW YORK Rule 11 [hereinafter cited as
N.Y. LOCAL RULES]. Rule II provides that nine different items can be taxed as
costs: trial transcripts, depositions, witness fees, mileage and subsistence, interpreting
costs, exemplification and costs of papers, maps, charts, photographs and summaries,
docket fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1923, master's, receiver's and commissioner's
fees and costs for title searches. Id. The Rules then provide the specific circumstances
under which these expenses can be recovered. Id.
74. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985).
75. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, subpoenas may be served for
the production of documents or persons or for depositions or trials. FED. R. CIv.
P. 45. The subpoena must, however, include "the fees for one day's attendance
and the mileage allowed by law." Id. These fees are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1821
(1982) and mandate that each witness be paid $30 per day for each day's attendance
at trial or deposition, see 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (1982), as well as the actual expenses
of transportation by common carrier, see 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(l) (1982), or a mileage
allowance, see 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2) (1982), and toll charges and parking fees.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(3) (1982). The ordinary range of a subpoena is the limits
of the district in which the court sits, a radius within 100 miles of the court
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e), or any place within the state
where the law would permit service. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e); see FED. R. Civ. P.
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expenses for the production of trial exhibits,76 deposition transcripts,"
4(f) (subpoena may be served within territorial limits provided in Rule 45). The Supreme
Court has ruled that the 100 mile rule is not an absolute limit to the ability of the court
to order payment of witness expenses, but is a proper consideration. Farmer v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227 (1964). Courts have subsequently exercised
their discretion to both grant and deny costs beyond the 100 mile limit. See 6 J.
MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE J 54.77 (2d ed.
1985). In addition to transportation costs, section 1821(d) also allows a subsistence
allowance for witnesses required to stay overnight. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1982). See
generally Costs and A wards, supra note 68, at 575-84.
However, expert witness fees, which are generally one of the most substantial
expenses incurred by a party in litigation, are not recoverable as costs beyond the
amount paid to ordinary witnesses. The general rule on this point was established
by the Supreme Court more than fifty years ago in Henkel v. Chicago, St. Paul,
Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 444, 445 (1932), accord Disaster at
Kennedy Airport, 687 F.2d at 631; Cleverock Energy Corp. v. Trepel, 609 F.2d
1358, 1363 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980).
Some courts have however awarded expert witness fees under the guise of
attorney's fees recoverable under the Fees Act. See Thornberry v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc. 676 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 461 U.S. 952, on remand,
109 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1983); Berry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30, 34 (5th Cir. 1982);
Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 453
U.S. 950 (1981). Contra Kivi v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 695 F.2d 1285 (lth
Cir. 1983); Quy v. Air America, Inc., 667 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Lyons v.
Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. 1147, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Mastrapas v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 93 F.R.D. 401 (E.D. Mich. 1982). See generally Costs and Awards,
supra note 68, at 581-84.
76. Under the rubric of "fees" for "exemplification and copies of papers
necessarily obtained for use in the case," pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), the
expense of preparing a large variety of exhibits for trial has been found recoverable.
See, e.g., Disaster at Kennedy Airport, 687 F.2d at 631 (costs of producing transcripts
of a flight recorder tape); EEOC v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1, 620 F.2d
1220, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1980) (considering costs and computer expenses); Harrington
v. Texaco, Inc., 339 F.2d 814, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915
(1965) (scientific survey of oil wells); Appliance Inv. Co. v. Western Elec. Co.,
61 F.2d 752, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1983) (technical drawings); Victor Talking Mach.
Co. v. Starr Piano Co., 281 F. 60 (2d Cir.) (special photography of tools in
operation), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 726 (1922). Prior approval should, however, be
sought from the court. Costs and Awards, supra note 68, at 584-86.
77. Deposition transcript feep .iv recoverable as costs where "necessarily obtained
for use in the case." 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) (1982). The courts have generally interpreted
that phrase to mean that deposition costs can be taxed even if the deposition is
not introduced into evidence. See Disaster at Kennedy Airport, 687 F.2d at 631;
Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 1087, 1100 (5th Cir. 1982);
Allen v. U.S. Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 697 (5th Cir. 1982); Illinois v. Sangamo
Constr. Co., 657 F.2d 855, 867 (7th Cir. 1981); Koppinger v. Cullen-Schiltz &
Assocs., 513 F.2d 901, 911 (8th Cir. 1975); Mailer v. RKO Teleradio Pictures,
Inc., 332 F.2d 747, 749 (2d Cir. 1964); Costs and Awards, supra note 32, at 567-
71. The Local Rules in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York are more
restrictive, allowing recovery of deposition costs only if at least part of a deposition
was received into evidence at trial or used by the court in ruling on a summary
judgment motion but not where it is used solely for discovery or impeachment
purposes. N.Y. LOCAL RULES, supra note 73, Rule 11(c)(2). Once the costs of the
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trial transcripts,"8 translation expenses, 9 and the costs of references
to a master. 80In addition to taxable costs, Congress has added attorney's fees
"as part of the costs'" of litigation in a numb&r of statutes-most
significantly, the Civil Rights' Attorney's Fees-Act of 1976.81
D. When Rule 68 Comes into Play: Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
August
In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August,82 the plaintiff brought st'it
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that she had been
discharged by her employer because of her race.83 A few months
deposition become taxable, certain expenses incidental to it become recoverable.
See 6 J. MOORE, -W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'SFEDERAL PRACTICE J 54.77[41
(2d ed. 1985).
78. "Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript
necessarily obtained for use in the case" are recoverable as costs. 28 U.S.C. §
1920(2) (1982). The courts have required that the transcript be "necessarily" obtained
as-the basis for .their discretion in granting or allowing'costs. See 6 J. MOORE,
W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'.S FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77[7] (2d ed. 1985).
However, the extra costs 6f daily copy can be recovered only where some special
necessity rather than convenience of counsel required that they be ordered. Disaster
at Kennedy Airport, 687 F.2d at 632; Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 999 (2d
Cir. 1973); Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. 1147, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. f983); Costs
and Awards, supra note 68, at 571-73.
79. Bennett Chem. Co. v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd., 24 F.R.D. 200, 204
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (amount for translation necessary for use in action is allowable
in bill of costs when necessary for exemplification of matters before cost); Gotz
v. Universal Prods. Co., 3 F.R.D. 153, 185 (D.C. Del. 1943) (in patent infringement
suit, where evidence 'obtained from Germany was necessary and relied upon to
establish defense, costs of translations were allowable to successful defendant);
Raffold Process Corp. v. Castanea Paper Co., 25 F. Supp. 593, 595-96 (W.D. Pa.
1938) (allowance made to defendant on its bill of costs for costs of photostats of
references and translations of the references, where they were all necessarily qbtained
for use in defense of action).
80. Federal Rule of. Civil Procedure 53 allows the court in both jury or non-
jury matters to appoint a special master to "report only upon particular issues
... or to receive and report" evidence only." FED. R. CIV. P. 53. Rule 53(a)
provides that the "compensation to be' allowed to a master shall be fixed by the
court, and shall be charged upon such of the parties or paid out of any fund or
subject matter of the action . I..." /d  The costs and expenses of such masters
are recoverable as costs. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920). The creation
of federal magistrates to ease the burden on federal district court judges has reduced
the need for masters.
81. For the full text of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, see supra
note 2.
82. 450 U.S. 346 (1981).
83. Id.; see Note, Delta Air Lines v. August, The Agony of Victory and the
Thrill of Defeat, 35 ARK. L. REV. 604 (1982) [hereinafter cited as The Agony of
Victory]. I . : . .
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into the litigation, the defendant made an offer of judgment for
$450, including all accrued attorney's fees and costs as of that date:84
Plaintiff rejected the offer, went to trial, and lost."5 The district
court ordered each side to bear its own costs.86 Defendant moved
for modification of the judgment, asserting that Rule 68 made cost
shifting mandatory.87 The district court denied the motion on the
ground that the offer had not been made in a "good faith" effort
to settle because the offer was not "arguably reasonable." 8 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the same
ground, noting that at the time the offer was made, plaintiff's
attorney's fees exceeded $450.89 While conceding that there was "little
authority on the point," the Seventh Circuit read a "reasonableness
requirement" into Rule 68, whereby an offer must be made in good
faith. 90 After examining the potential strength of plaintiff's case, the
court found that the Rule 68 offer of "less than $500 before trial
[was] not of such significance . . . to justify serious consideration
by the plaintiff." 91
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the Delta Air Lines
case on the issue of whether a Rule 68 offer must be made in good
faith, but affirmed on different grounds. 92 The Court found that
the lower courts had failed to confront the threshold question of
whether Rule 68 was applicable in situations where an offeree recovers
nothing. 93 The Court concluded that the Rule is not applicable in
such situations, 94 but rather applies where the plaintiff obtains a
judgment that is exceeded by the defendant's offer. 95 Where judgment
is for the defendant, or where the plaintiff recovers a judgment in
84. Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 346.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 349.
87. Id. The defendant contended "that under Rule 68 the plaintiff should be
required to pay the costs incurred by defendant after the offer of judgment had
been refused." Id.
88. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 640, 641
(N.D. I1. 1978). The district court stated that "an offer of only the sum of $450
could only have been effective were the plaintiff's claim totally lacking in merit
or were there present additional factors which would mitigate in favor of the
defendant." Id. at 641. Since the plaintiff's claim was not totally lacking in merit,
the offer of $450 was not "arguably reasonable." Id.
89. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d 699, 701-02 (7th Cir. 1979).
90. Id. at 700 n.3, 701-02.
91. Id. at 701.
92. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 350-52 (1981).
93. See id.
94. Id. at 352.
95. See id.
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excess of the offer, the Rule is inoperative. In addition, the Court
held that when Rule 68 is operative, its cost-shifting provisions are
mandatory.
96
The Delta Air Lines decision creates an anomaly in that plaintiffs
are better off losing altogether than winning minimal recoveries where
Rule 68 offers have been made. 97 If the plaintiff loses altogether,
the court retains its discretion under Rule 54(d) to deny costs to
the prevailing defendant.98 Yet, if the plaintiff wins even a dollar in
nominal damages, Rule 68 not only precludes his recovery of costs,
but also requires that he bear the costs accrued by the defendant
after the making of the offer. 99 Under these circumstances, a nominal
winner could, in reality, become the loser. °°
96. Id. at 352-55.
97. See id. at 366-71 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 68; see Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346,
374-75 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., dissenting).
100. This paradoxical result was criticized by the dissent. Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, in his dissent, stated: "To
circumscribe rule 68 in the manner in which the Court does is to virtually cut it
adrift from the remaining related portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a construction which could be justified only by the strongest considerations of
history and policy." Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 371 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., dissenting).
The dissent further stated:
Contrary to the view of the Court, I think that Rule 68 and Rule 54(d)
are entirely consistent with one another when read in a manner faithful
to their actual language; indeed, the language of these Rules must be
twisted virtually beyond recognition, and that of Rule 68 parsed virtually
out of existence, to say that the latter Rule does not apply in a situation
such as this simply because the petitioner prevailed.
Id. at 374; see also The Agony of Victory, supra note 83 at 604.
The result in Delta rewards plaintiffs with cases lacking enough merit
to prevail, penalizes plaintiffs with cases having just enough merit to
prevail (though to a lesser extent than the offer), and destroys virtually
all inducement to make offers of judgment . . . . Delta's reasoning is
unsupported by the history behind rule 68, the purposes for rule 68,
and fundamental principles of statutory interpretation, but the most
persuasive reason for declining to accept the reasoning in Delta is the
incongruity of the result. Before the reasoning in Delta can be explained
without resort to an exercise in semantic calisthenics, the chief question
posed by the decision must be answered: Why should defendants be
rewarded for losing and penalized for prevailing?
Id. at 633; see also Note, The Application of An Offer of Judgment in a Title
VII Suit, 2 PACE L. REV. 331, 348 (1982) ("As a result of August, the Supreme
Court has turned Rule 68 into a potentially unjust Rule") [hereinafter cited as
Offer of Judgment in a Title VII Suit]; Note, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August:
Taking the Teeth Out of Rule 68, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 765, 768 (1981-82) ("The
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While limiting the application of Rule 68, the Supreme Court
confused the very issue upon which it had granted certiorari-whether
an offer must be made in good faith. The Court, concerned that
nominal offers would trigger the Rule, noted that it would be
unreasonable to conclude that the drafters of the Federal Rules
would "grant the district judge discretion to deny costs to the
prevailing party under Rule 54(d)," only to give defendants "the
power to take away that discretion by performing a token act'""
such as the making of a nominal offer.
The Court, however, declined to read a reasonableness requirement
into the Rule, finding that a "literal interpretation" of the "plain
language of the Rule" makes such a requirement unnecessary.0 2 The
Court reasoned that by holding Rule 68 inapplicable when plaintiff
recovers nothing, sham offers would be useless and defendants would
be "encouraged to make only realistic settlement offers."'0 3 Despite
language to the contrary, the Court nevertheless indicated that a
reasonableness requirement would be the fair and evenhanded means
of applying Rule 68.104
The ambiguous language of Delta Air Lines makes sense only
because the Court limits Rule 68 to cases in which the plaintiff has
prevailed. The Court notes that Rule 68 would be useless if defendants
could regularly offer minimal sums at the beginning of a lawsuit
as a strategy to assure recovery of their costs if they were to win.'0 5
Thus, the Court deems that a reasonableness test is already built
into the Rule.
Notwithstanding the limited applicability attributed to Rule 68 by
the Delta Air Lines decision, it is a potentially powerful settlement
tool. The Rule benefits plaintiffs by encouraging defendants to offer
reasonable settlements early in the litigation. Moreover, offers must
reflect realistic appraisals of the case in order to be of any use to
defendants,' °0 as an unreasonably low offer can safely be ignored
by the plaintiff.
Delta conclusion that Rule 68 does not apply to losing plaintiffs evidences some
futndamental misconceptions about the spirit and purpose of Rule 68") [hereinafter
cited as Taking the Teeth Out of Rule 68).
101. Delta Air Lines Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 353 (1981).
102. Id. at 355-56.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 353.
105. Id. at 353.
106. It can be argued that what a case is really "worth" will vary from time
to time as the case progresses and that an offer made at the beginning of the case
might have been unreasonable when made but reasonable later and that the plaintiff
19861
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It has frequently been stated that Rule 68 is greatly underutilized. 07
Much of the Rule's use, however, takes place behind the scenes and
is known only to the parties.'08 One reason for the Rule's apparent
should not be penalized for the decision to reject the offer. This reasoning is
unrealistic. While the strength of plaintiff's case may change due to the vagaries
of litigation, the amount of damages should generally be ascertainable at the
beginning of the suit and will generally not change substantially. This is particularly
true in cases involving physical or psychological injury or contract breach where
damages are within the knowledge of the plaintiff. Furthermore, all litigation contains
an element of risk. Most experienced lawyers can tell woeful tales about settlement
offers they are sorry they made or turned down. There is no reason to insulate
plaintiffs from the effects of what turns out to be a mistake.
This is not to say that there are not some types of litigation such as antitrust
where the plaintiff will need to have some discovery from the defendant to have
an accurate idea of what he might win at trial. The built-in safeguard is that in
those cases, the defendant will also need discovery from the plaintiff to make an
intelligent offer which stands a reasonable chance of exceeding the ultimate verdict.
The 1984 Proposed Revision would cure this "problem" by keeping the offer
open for 60 days unless withdrawn sooner and by requiring the offeree to provide
any discoverable information necessary to evaluate the offer. 1984 Proposed Re-
vision, 98 F.R.D. 361 (1983).
107. The Notes of the Advisory Committee on the 1984 Revision, 98 F.R.D.
361 (1983), states that Rule 68 "has rarely been invoked and has been considered
largely ineffective as a means of achieving its goals." Id. at 363.
108. If the Rule works as intended and the offer is accepted, the court's role
is limited to the ministerial act of entering judgment in accordance with the Rule.
The Rule provides that "If within ten days after the service of the offer the adverse
party serves written notice that the offer is accepted then either party may then
file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and
thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 68. If the offer catalyzes
a later settlement, only the parties will know of it. It will only come to the attention
of the court if the offer is rejected, the case goes to trial, and the judgment is
for an amount less than the offer.
Despite all the pronouncements about how "little used" Rule 68 is, the reported
cases show Rule 68 offers being made and reported in a surprisingly wide variety
of circumstances. Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 746 F.2d 278,
285 (5th Cir. 1984) (offer of judgment in admiralty collision case); Dias v. Bank
of Hawaii, 732 F.2d 1401, 1402 (9th Cir. 1984) (offer made in Truth-In-Lending
case); Schumann v. Levi, 728 F.2d 1141, 1142 (8th Cir. 1984) (Rule 68 offer made.
in dispute over sale); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1329 (5th Cir. 1977) (offer
made in class action); Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Rule
68 offer made but rejected); Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377, 1379 (7th Cir. 1973)
(Rule 68 offer made and accepted); Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 602
F. Supp. 1189, 1203 (D. Mass. 1985) (offer in breach of contract dispute between
actress and orchestra); Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 574 F. Supp.
1407, 1414 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (extremely large Rule 68 offer made in airplane crash
wrongful death case); Blue v. United States, 567 F. Supp. 394, 399 n.6 (D. Conn.
1983) (offer made by United States in tort suit brought by prisoner for injuries
sustained in prison fire); Parrett v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 512 F. Supp. 1074
(E.D. La. 1981) (offer made in suit against insurance company over damage to
radar); Citizens for a Better Environment v. Village of Elm Grove, 485 F. Supp.
363 (E.D, Wisc. 1980) (offer made in action challenging ordinance on solicitors);
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disuse is that taxable costs are insufficient to make application of
the Rule worthwhile. 1°9 However, a more satisfactory explanation is
the Bar's unfamiliarity with it.'' °
II1. Awards of Attorney's Fees
The "American Rule" ' has been that a prevailing party may not
United States v. Motor Vessel Gopher State, 472 F. Supp. 556, 559 (E.D. Mo.
1979) ($102,500 offer in admiralty case); Conolly v. S.S. Karina 11, 302 F. Supp.
675, 683 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (offer in maritime salvage case).
109. One commentator, discussing the effect of the comparable rule in New York
Practice, N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAW § 3221, stated:
If the purpose of the present rule and its predecessor is to encourage
plaintiffs to forego a trial where reasonable settlement is possible, the
obvious question is: Does the imposition of a portion of the costs qualify
as a realistic inducement? For a case that involves more than a trivial
amount, the answer to this question must be that it does not.
King, Thumbs in the Dike: Procedures to Contain the Flood of Personal Injury
Litigation, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 223, 23.2 (1970) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original) [hereinafter cited as Thumbs in the Dike]; see also Note, Rule 68: A
"New" Tool for Litigation, 1978 DUKE L.J. 889, 890 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
A "New" Tool]. The Committee note to the 1984 Proposed Revision, supra note
56, at 363, states that the Rule "has been considered largely ineffective as a means
of achieving its goal."
110. The author of A "New" Tool, supra note 109, could point to only one
other law review article that discussed Rule 68, and the article cited only one Iowa
provision that was comparable to Rule 68. Id. at 890, n.9. However, since 1980,
at least nine articles have devoted substantial consideration to Rule 68. See Barnicle,
supra note 28; Branham, Offers of Judgment and Rule 68: A Response to the
Chief Justice, J. MAR. L. REV. 341 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Branham]; Silverstein
& Rosenblatt, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Rule 68 to Awards
of Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, 16 CONN. L. REV. 949 (1984); Simon,
Rule 68 at the Crossroads: Relation Between Offers of Judgment and Statutory At-
torney's Fees, 53 U. CINN. L. REV. 889 (1984); Note, Offer of Judgment and Statutorily
Authorized Attorney's Fees: A Reconciliation of the Scope and Purpose of Rule
68, 16 GA. L. REV. 482 (1982); Not e, The Conflict Between Rule 68 and the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fee Statute: Interpreting the Rules Enabling Act, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 818 (1985); Offer of Judgment in a Title VII Suit, supra note 109; Taking
the Teeth out of Rule 68, supra note 109.
Ill. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
The "American Rule" was first enunciated in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3
Dali.) 306 (1796), and has been followed ever since. See Day v. Woodworth, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851). The Court's decision in Arcambel has been criticized,
see, e.g., Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 642-44 (1974), but reiteration of the rule by the
Court since the time of Arcambel makes it law now even though it was not a
sound rule in 1796. In England, the losing party has long been responsible for the
prevailing party's attorney's fees. Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, ch.. 1 (1275)
("it is provided that the [victor] Demandant may recover against the Tenant the
Costs of his Writ purchased"); see Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 852 (1929);
Payne, Costs in Common Law Actions in the Federal Court, 21 VA. L. REV. 397
n.2 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Costs in Common Law Actions].
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recover attorney's fees as part of damages." 2 Exceptions to the
American Rule have been created through the years by both statute'"'
and common law.' One such exception, frequently employed during
the 1970's, involved the private attorney general theory." 5 Under
this theory, a private plaintiff is permitted to recover costs if he is
vindicating a public interest deemed by Congress to be of the highest
112. Attorney's fees were, however, recoverable as costs early in our history. In
1793, Congress enacted provisions allowing for an award of attorney's fees, in
admiralty or maritime proceedings, to the prevailing party as part of costs in
federal courts where fees were recoverable in the state where the court was sitting.
Act of Mar. 1, 1793, 2d Cong., 2d Sess. Ch. XX, I Stat. 332 §§ 1, 4. The Act
was renewed in 1796, Act of March 31, 1796, 4th Cong., 1st Sess., I Stat. 451,
but was then allowed to expire in 1799. Courts, however, continued to allow
attorney's fees as part of costs. In 1853, Congress acted to make the award of
costs nationally uniform and to eliminate fee awards. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 32d
Cong. 2d Sess., 10 Stat. 161. The Act of 1853 is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920,
1923(a) (1982). It was treated by the Supreme Court as terminating the right of
the plaintiff to recover attorney's fees as part of costs. See Flanders v. Tweed,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450, 452-53 (1872); The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377, 388-
92 (1869).
113. In the House debates over what would become the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Act of 1976, Congressman Drinan included a list of 55 separate federal statutes
which authorized the awarding of attorney's fees. 122 CONG. REC. 35,123 (statement
of Rep. Drinan). In 36 of the 55 statutes, Congress provided for recovery of
attorney's fees "as part of the costs," see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1982); 7 U.S.C.
§ 2305(a) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1982); 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1982); 49 U.S.C.
§ 11705(d)(3) (1982), or for "the cost of the suit including a reasonable attorney's
fee." See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)
(1982); 15 U.S.C. § 298(b), (c), (d) (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(d) (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1515(d) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(d) (1982); 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1982). Sometimes Congress specifically stated
that the fees would be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case or similar
language. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1982); 49 U.S.C. § 11705(d)(3) (1982).
On other occasions, Congress created a contingency fee arrangement (see e.g.,
22 U.S.C. § 277d-21 (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1982), 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982)),
or determined that fees should only be awarded in exceptional cases (7 U.S.C. §
2565 (1982)), or directed that the recovery come from a common fund (2 U.S.C.
§ 396 (1982), 12 U.S.C. § 1786(p) (1982)). In his dissent in Marek, Justice Brennan
attached a list of over 100 statutes that provide for attorney's fee awards as of
1985. Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3036-39.
114. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (attorney creating
common fund for others can recover from the fund); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527, 530-31 (attorney's fees as sanction for bad faith litigation); Toledo Scale
Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923) (contempt punishable
by award of attorney's fees to winning party).
115. Under the concept of private attorneys general, the district court could
invoke its equitable powers to award fees to counsel of parties who had brought
suits to vindicate larger public interests. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 264-67 (1975).
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priority." 6 These courts posited that, even absent specific statutory
authority, they were empowered to award fees under their equitable
jurisdiction. "17
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society," 8 however,
the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether the award
of attorney's fees to such "private attorney general" was permissible.
After examining the history of the various cost and fee statutes,
'the Court concluded that "it would be inappropriate for the Ju-
diciary, without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of
litigation" by awarding attorney's fees in the absence of Congres-
sional authority." 9 The Court, however, suggested that Congress
might provide such legislation, which advice Congress readily fol-
lowed by enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976.12()
116. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 538 F.2d 53,
58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976), on remand, 436 F. Supp. 657
(M.D. Pa. 1977) (denying claim for attorney's fees and costs), aff'd in part but
remanded on question of attorney's fees, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979), on remand, 501 F. Supp. 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (fees de-
termined); Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123, 127 n.l (2d Cir. 1974); La Raza Unida
v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101-02 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Thonen v. Jenkins,
517 F.2d 3, 7 (4th Cir. 1975) (court notes use of private attorney general theory
by several circuit courts); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 394 (M.D. Ala.
1972), modified on other grounds sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974).
117. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Sprague,
307 U.S. at 168-69; La Raza Unida, 57 F.R.D. at 102.
118. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
119. Id. at 247.
120. Hearings were held in both the Senate and the House generating extensive
testimony on the subject. See Awarding of Attorney's Fees: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975). In 1975, a bill
essentially similar to the Fees Act cleared the Senate Judiciary Committee but was
not taken up on the Senate floor. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94tb Cong., 1st Sess.
2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5909 [hereinafter cited
as SENATE REPORT]. The same bill (S. 2278) was then resubmitted on July 31,
1975 and was subsequently sent to the Senate floor on September 21, 1976. 122
CONG. REC. 31,470 (1976). The bill was debated at considerable length and, after
a minor amendment by Senator Allen of Alabama, was passed by the full Senate
on September 29, 1976. 122 CONG. REC. 33,315 (1976) (bill passed by a vote of
57 yeas to 15 nays).
The House then proceeded to take up the Senate Bill on October 1, 1976. 122
CONG. REC. 35,114-30 (1976). Similar legislation had cleared the House Judiciary
Committee on September 9, 1976. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1976) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. After a relatively brief debate in the
House, the bill was passed, 122 CONG. REC. 35,130 (1976) (bill passed by vote of
306 yeas to 68 nays), and subsequently signed into law on October 26, 1976. 122
CONG. REC. 35,087 (1976). Accompanying the legislation were detailed reports by
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The Fees Act provides that the fee awards under the Act are to
follow the same standards as those provided by the Civil Rights
Act of 19642 ' and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975,2 '
both of which had similar attorney's fees provisions. Thus, case law
interpreting these other fee-shifting statutes provides precedent for
fee awards under the Fees Act.' 3 Conversely, the Supreme Court
has held that the mechanics involved in fixing fees under the Fees
Act should also be applied to other types of fee awards. 2
4
Litigation over attorney's fees is rapidly developing into a separate
sub-specialty. In order to gain a clear understanding of the rela-
tionship between Rule 68 and other statutes granting attorney's fees
"as part of the costs" of litigation, a general discussion of how
fee awards are made is necessary. However, a fully detailed expla-
nation of the law which has quickly grown up under the Fees Act
is beyond the scope of this Article.
A. Fee Recovery Under the Fees Act
Under the Fees Act, a prevailing plaintiff "should ordinarily
recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render
such an award unjust.' ' 25 In contrast, prevailing defendants may
the Senate and House. SENATE REPORT, supra; HOUSE REPORT, supra. These reports
attempted to resolve in advance some of the issues Congress felt would be likely
to arise. Among other things, the House and Senate Reports discuss prevailing
party issues, House Report, supra, at 6, defendant's recovery of fees, SENATE
REPORT, supra, at 5, HousE REPORT, supra, at 6-7, and the amount of fees, SENATE
REPORT, supra, at 6, HousE REPORT, supra, at 8-9.
121. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). The 1964 Act is codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1982).
122. Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975).
123. The Senate Report states that Congress intended "the standards for awarding
fees [to] be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act." SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 4. This intent was recognized by the
Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983), and in
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 n.4 (1980) (per curiam), reh'g denied,
448 U.S. 913 (1980).
124. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); see also Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 275-76 (3rd Cir.) (applying
Fees Act principles to Clean Air Act), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 57 (1985); Southwest
Marine, Inc. v. Campbell Indus., 732 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir.) (Fees Act standards
applied to Clayton Act), cert. denied sub nora., Triple "A" Machine Shop, Inc.
v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 564 (1984); United Slate, Tile and Composition
Roofers v. G & M Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., 732 F.2d 495, 502-03 (6th Cir.
1984) (applying Hensley standards to Fair Labor Standards Act); Cohen v. West
Haven Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 638 F.2d 496, 504-06 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying Title
VII principles to Revenue Sharing Act).
125. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). See North-
cross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (citing
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recover under the Fees Act only if the action is unfounded, meritless,
frivolously or vexatiously brought, although bad faith need not be
Newman). This standard was specifically adopted in the Senate and House Reports.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 4; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 120, at 6.
As case law has interpreted the Fees Act, this standard has come to mean that
prevailing plaintiffs will almost always recover their attorney's fees. Among the
circumstances which have been found insufficient to bar an award of attorney's
fees are: (1) Defendants acted in good faith and thus should not be penalized,
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 739 (1980); Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S.
400, 402 (1968); (2) The government defendant is in bad financial condition,
Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); (3) Plaintiff was financially able to retain private
counsel and pay his own fees, Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1981);
International Oceanic Enter., Inc. v. Menton, 614 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1980); In-
ternational Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Collins, 609 F.2d 151 (5th
Cir. 1980); (4) Plaintiffs recovered only nominal damages, Fast v. School Dist. of
Ladue, 728 F.2d 1030, 1033-35 (8th Cir. 1984); Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874,
899 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d
112, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1983); Williams v. Thomas, 692 F.2d 1032, 1038 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied sub nom. Dallas County v. Williams, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983);
Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915, 918 (1st Cir. 1980); Coop v. City of South
Bend, 635 F.2d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 1980); Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 617-18 (4th
Cir. 1978); (5) The plaintiff received free representation from a public interest
organization, New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 70 n.9 (1980);
Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1304-07 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Johnson v.
University College, 706 F.2d 1205, 1210 (1ith Cir.) (suit maintained on contingency
fee arrangement), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); Lamphere v. Brown Univ.,
610 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1979) (same); Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir.
1979) (fact that defendant was represented by a federally funded legal services
agency was not a bar to collecting a fee), cert. denied sub nom. Russo v. Holly,
446 U.S. 913 (1980); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 120, at 8 n.16 (citing Torres v.
Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) for the proposition that a defendant is not
barred from recovering a fee because he is represented by an organization or is
himself an organization); (6) The fees would be an unjust burden on taxpayers
not involved in the discriminatory act, Aware Woman Clinic, Inc. v. City of Cocoa
Beach, 629 F.2d 1146, 1149-50 (5th Cir. 1980); (7) Defendant won its counterclaim,
Johnson v. Nordstrom-Larpenteur Agency, Inc., 623 F.2d 1279, 1282 (8th Cir.),
cert denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); (8) Attorney's fees would exceed compensatory
damages, Cooperative v. City of South Bend, 635 F.2d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 1980);
(9) The non-prevailing parties have to pay substantial fees to their own attorneys,
Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 1981); (10) The United States
was a co-plaintiff in a consolidated case, United States v. Terminal Transplant
Co., 653 F.2d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Truck Drivers
and Helpers Local Union No. 728 v. Allen, 455 U.S. 989 (1982) or was in fact
the chief wrongdoer, Crosby v. Bowling, 683 F.2d 1068, 1074-75 (7th Cir. 1982);
(11) Plaintiffs failed to specifically request fees as part of the relief requested in
their complaint, Local 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. City of Rocky Mount, 672
F.2d 376, 381 (4th Cir. 1982); (12) The plaintiffs or their counsel behaved improperly,
Bonnes v. Long, 651 F.2d 214, 218-19 (4th Cir. 1981) (Rehnquist & O'Connor,
J.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 961 (1982). See generally Note, Judicial
Discretion and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act-What Special
Circumstances Render an Award Unjust, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 320 (1982).
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shown specifically. 2 6 The Supreme Court has defined "meritless"
to mean that the action is "groundless or without foundation."' 27
1. Prevailing Party
To recover attorney's fees under the Fees Act one must first
prevail in the action. In the seminal case of Hensley v. Eckerhart,28
the Supreme Court adopted a liberal rule for determining whether
a party meets this threshold test. The party must " 'succeed on any
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the
parties sought in bringing suit.' "I29 The same standard was expressed
126. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (citing
Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976)). The Court noted
that there are at least two equitable considerations favoring an attorney's fee award
to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff that are wholly absent in the case of a Title VII
defendant: first, the plaintiff is Congress' chosen instrument to vindicate a policy
that Congress has considered to be of the highest priority; second, when a district
court awards counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a
violator of federal law. 434 U.S. at 418-19; see SENATE REPORT, supra note 120,
at 5; 122 CONG. REC. 35,124 (1976) (statement of Cong. Drinan). There is authority
for such an award in all federal litigation where a party has acted "in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City
of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985); 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J.
WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE I1 54.77[2], at 1709 (2d ed. 1985); see, e.g.,
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Perichak v. International Union of Elec.
Radio and Mach. Workers, Local 601, 715 F.2d 78, 80 (3rd Cir. 1983); Nemeroff
v. Abelson, 704 F.2d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1983); Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42, 46
(2d Cir. 1978); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d
1078, 1088-89 (2d Cir. 1977). There is also statutory authority for an award of fees
and costs against counsel where counsel "so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982); see United States v.
Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1144 (1983);
Bankers Trust Co. v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 641 F.2d 1361 (2d Cir. 1981); North
Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Harrell v. Joffrion, 73 F.R.D. 267, 268 (W.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 545 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1976) (mem.).
A recent amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 has also required
counsel to sign all his pleadings and declare that such signature constitutes a
"certificate" by the attorney that "he has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; [and] that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law . . . . " FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The Second Circuit recently remanded a meritless
antitrust/civil rights suit for the imposition of the sanction of the defendant's
attorneys fees upon the plaintiff's counsel and/or its client. Eastway Constr. Corp.
v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985).
127. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-6 (1980); Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
128. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
129. Id. at 433 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.
1978)).
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in the Senate Report: a party need "not prevail on all issues," so
long as he "has prevailed on an important matter in the course of
the litigation."'' 0
2. Fixing Attorney's Fees: The Lodestar Approach
Once it has been established that a party has prevailed, the court
must fix the amount of the attorney's fee which the party is entitled
to recover. Two tests have been developed to make this determination.
The oldest test is the twelve factor test set forth in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc.3 The newer, more common method
follows the "Lodestar" approach whereby attorney's fees are de-
termined by multiplying the number of hours billed by the hourly
rate normally charged for similar work "by attorneys of like skill
in the area."' This approach also gives the trial court discretion
to adjust the fee upward or downward if appropriate.
The Lodestar formula, while appearing simple, is not easy to
administer. The first step is to determine the extent to which the
130. SENATE REPORT, supra, note 120, at 5. A party need not recover on the
central issue of the litigation but must obtain some of the relief sought. See Pollock
v. Baxter Manor Nursing Home, 716 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), rev'g
706 F.2d 236 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
131. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The twelve Johnson factors are: (1) time and
labor expended by attorneys; (2) novelty and difficulty of the case; (3) attorney's
skill; (4) the effect that this case had on counsel's ability to take on other work;
(5) the attorney's customary fee; (6) nature of the fee; (7) unusual time limitation
imposed on the litigants; (8) amount of money involved in the claim and the
outcome of the claim; (9) experience, ability and reputation of counsel; (10) "un-
desirability" of being associated with the cause; (11) nature and length of litigant's
and counsel's professional relationship; and (12) awards made in similar cases. Id.
at 717-19.
Johnson is specifically cited in the SENATE REPORT, supra note 120, at 6 and
the HousE REPORT, supra note 120, at 8. The Johnson factors are consistent with
those recommended by the American Bar Association MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-106 (1982).
132. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Grinnell II). See also Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 112 (3rd Cir. 1976) (en banc) (applying "Lodestar"
approach with adjustments). The twelve Johnson factors and the "Lodestar" ap-
proach should essentially lead to the same result. The twelve Johnson factors will
be reflected in the hours spent on the case or in the attorney's hourly rate. The
novelty and difficulty of the case, and any unusual time limitations will be reflected
in the number of hours expended. The attorney's skill, his customary fee, his
experience, ability and reputation will likely be reflected in the hourly rate
awarded. See Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575, 583 &
n.15 (5th Cir. 1980) (antitrust case where court held that "Lodestar" calculation
should be adjusted to reflect Johnson factors), aff'd in relevant part after remand,
684 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1982).
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prevailing party has succeeded. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 133 the Su-
preme Court stated that in order to determine the extent of a
plaintiff's success, a court must determine the issues upon which
the plaintiff prevailed. 3 4 Where the plaintiff's success is partial, a
reduction in attorney's fees may be made by the district court, either
by separating out the hours spent on non-prevailing issues or by
making across-the-board reductions.'35
The reasoning of the Hensley holding, that the extent of a plain-
tiff's success is crucial in determining the appropriate amount of
attorney's fees, should apply to cases involving multiple plaintiffs
or defendants. Attorney's fees incurred for work done on behalf of
non-prevailing plaintiffs should not be recoverable unless that work
is intrinsically related to work done for prevailing parties. 3 6 More-
over, fees incurred for work carried out against prevailing defendants
133. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 436-37. The Court noted that'in some circumstances, a single lawsuit
may contain 'distinctly different claims based on different facts. For the purposes
of determining the attorney's fee award, time expended on unsuccessful claims
must be treated as if it had been spent on a different lawsuit. Id. at 434-35. See
Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., Inc. 733 F.2d 55, 58-59 (8th Cir. 1984); United
Slate Tile and Composition Roofers v. G & M Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., 732
F.2d 495, 504-05 (6th Cir. 1984); Willie M. v. Hunt, 732 F.2d 383, 385-87 (4th
Cir. 1984); Perkins v. Cross, 728 F.2d 1099, 1100 (8th Cir. 1984); Fast v. School
Dist. of Ladue, 728 F.2d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wojtkowski v.
Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 130 (1st Cir. 1984); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723
F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983); Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1119 (7th Cir.
1983); Webb v. County Bd. of Educ. of Dyer County, 715 F.2d 254, 259-60 (6th
Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1923 (1985); Rutherford v. Pitchess, 713 F.2d 1416,
1421-22 (9th Cir. 1983); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 556-57 (10th Cir. 1983);
Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. 1147, 1152-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Dunten v.
Kibler, 518 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (N.D. Ga. 1981); cf. Illinois Welfare Rights Org.
v. Miller, 723 F.2d 564, 567 (7th Cir. 1983) (:Xle spent on related but unsuccessful
claims should not automatically be excluded from fee calculation); Clanton v.
Orleans Parish School Bd., 649 F.2d 1084, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1981) (portion of
time spent on unsuccessful claims contributed to the development of claims that
were successful. Where there is a common core of facts, the court should view
the suit in terms of the "overall relief" obtained. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 435 (1982); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978); Abraham v.
Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167, 175 (3rd Cir.) (time spent on preparation of depositions
prepared for the unsuccessful claim but used to prove an element of the successful
claim is recoverable), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3513 (1984); White v. City of
Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1983) (since appellee's success was
complete, it was unnecessary to reduce plaintiff's award).
136. See Perkins v. Cross, 728 F.2d 1099, 1100 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Redding
v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983) (award of attorney's fees for
prisoner appearing pro se was inappropriate).
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should not be recoverable' 37 unless it meets the same requirement. 38
In addition to eliminating hours expended upon work on non-
prevailing issues or parties, the lower court should scrutinize the fee
application for unnecessary work. Counsel is expected to exercise
"billing judgment" in assessing the proper amount of time to be
spent on a case. 39 However, if the work is necessary for the success
of the lawsuit, then even work only indirectly connected with the
lawsuit may be recompensed. 40A party seeking an award of attorney's fees has the burden of
establishing and documenting the time expended and the hourly rate
at which he seeks reimbursement. 4 This burden must be met by
producing billing time records which are maintained in a manner
that will enable "a reviewing court to identify distinct claims.' ' 42
137. Glass v. Pfeffer, 657 F.2d 252, 256 (10th Cir. 1981); Coop v. City of South
Bend, 635 F.2d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 1980); Wattleton v. Ladish Co., 520 F. Supp.
1329, 1351 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Arkansas Community Orgs. for Reform Now v.
Arkansas Bd. of Optometry, 468 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Scheriff
v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (D. Colo. 1978).
138. Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Dunten
v. Kibler, 518 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Wattleton v. Ladish Co'.,
520 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Arkansas Community Orgs. for Reform Now
v. Arkansas State Bd. of Optometry, 468 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (E.D. Ark. 1979);
Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (D. Colo. 1978).
139. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (quoting Copeland v.
Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). The Court stated:
Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good-faith effort to
exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or oth-
erwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated
to exclude such hours from his fee submission. "In the private sector,
'billing judgment' is an important component in fee setting. It is no less
important here. Hours that are not properly billed to one's client also
are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to statutory authority."
Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 390, 401, 671 F.2d 880, 891
(1980) (en banc) (emphasis in original).
Id.; see Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553-54 (10th Cir. 1983); Gagne v. Maher,
594 F.2d 336, 345 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); Cleary v. Blum, 507
F. Supp. 514, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Sharrock v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 913, 915
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Scott v. Bradley, 455 F. Supp. 672, 675 (E.D. Va. 1978); Boe
v. Colello, 447 F. Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also McCann v. Coughlin,
698 F.2d 112, 131 (2d Cir. 1983) (court must have billing records in order to
determine whether counsel's time was spent productively).
140. See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980)
(actions in state administrative proceeding outside title VII action are compensable);
Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982) (counsel's actions to
debar defendant led to settlement of the action and was, therefore, compensable),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956 (1983).
141. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
142. Id. at 437.
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While the attorney's records need not be exceedingly detailed, they
should identify the general subject matter on which time was spent.'43
Once the court has calculated the number of compensable hours,
it must fix the hourly compensation rate. The claimant has the
burden of proving that the requested rates are comparable to those
paid for similar services of lawyers in the community who have
similar skill, experience and reputation. '44
3. Adjustments of Attorney's Fees
After calculating the number of compensable hours at the pre-
vailing market rate, the court should decide whether the figure should
be adjusted either upward for exceptional work or downward for
unsatisfactory work.'4 5 In Blum v. Stenson,'4 6 the Supreme Court
argued against making such adjustments except in rare instances.
The Court noted that in most cases adjustments are unnecessary
because the quality of representation is reflected in the hourly rate.'47
The Court rejected the theory that the novelty or complexity of the
issues call for upward adjustment of the fee, since such factors
should be reflected in the number of billable hours and counsel's
hourly rate.' 48 In addition, the Court held that the number of people
affected by the ruling should not be a consideration for upward
adjustment, because counsel should be diligent regardless of the
number of clients he is representing.' 49 Thus the quality of repre-
143. Id. at 437 n.12 (citing Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (1st Cir.
1978). Some courts will allow reconstructed records. Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 713
F.2d 972, 978 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984); Johnson v.
University College, 706 F.2d 1205, 1207 (l1th Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994
(1983); Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1473
.(9th Cir. 1983). However the trend is toward requiring contemporaneous time
records. The Second Circuit has stated that any fee requests for work done after
June 15, 1983 which are not supported by contemporaneous time records will be
denied. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d
1136, 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Wojtkowski v. Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 130
(1st Cir. 1984), Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553 (10th Cir. 1983). Failure to
produce such records can result in either reduction of a percentage of the total
claimed hours, or denial of reimbursement for undocumented hours. In Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court approved an across-the-
board reduction of thirty percent due to an attorney's inexperience and failure to
keep contemporaneous time records. Id. at 438 n.13.
144. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984).
145. Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220, 223 (5th Cir. 1983); Anderson v. Morris,
658 F.2d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 1981).
146. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
147. Id. at 899.
148. Id. at 898-99.
149. Id. at 900 n.16.
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sentation justifies an upward adjustment only in the rare instances
in which the quality of the work is not reflected in the hourly rates
and where there has been exceptional success.5 0 Conversely, where
the quality of representation or the results are poor, the fee award
may be reduced. 5'
IV. Rule 68 and Attorney's Fees
The escalating number of cases being litigated over large fee awards
in civil rights actions has caused Rule 68's cost-shifting mechanism
to become an attractive tool for defense counsel seeking to cut off
the plaintiff's right to receive attorney's fees accruing after an offer.
In July of 1985, the Supreme Court held, in Marek v. Chesny,52
that an unaccepted offer under Rule 68 cuts off the plaintiff's post-
offer attorney's fees where such fees are recoverable "as part of
the costs."' 53 In its determination, the Court examined whether
statutory attorney's fees are recoverable as part of the costs for
purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), and
whether the policy considerations underlying the award of such fees
would override the policy embodied in Rule 68 of encouraging
settlements. 114
A. Do "Costs" Include Attorney's Fees Under Rule 68?
In the seven years prior to the Marek decision, the Supreme Court,
on a number of occasions, addressed the question of whether at-
150. Id. at 899.
151. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
In Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984), the Supreme Court acknowledged
that "there may be circumstances in which the basic standard of reasonable rates
multiplied by reasonably expended hours results in a fee that is either unreasonably
low or unreasonably high." Id. at 1548. For discussions of negative multipliers,
see DeFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1985); Cunningham v. City
of McKeesport, 753 F.2d 262, 26. (3d Cir. 1985); Lynch v. City of Milwaukee,
747 F.2d 423, 429-30 (7th Cir. 1984).
152. 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985).
153. Id. at 3016-17.
154. Id. at 3017-18. These were the two major issues which had been litigated
in the Seventh Circuit. In addition, the circuit court criticized the district court's
reading of Rule 68 to include attorney's fees, 720 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1983),
such an interpretation would prevent a plaintiff from recovering attorney's fees to
which he is entitled under substantive law. Under the Rules Enabling Act, Congress
delegated authority to the Supreme Court to make rules governing the "practice
and procedure" of the federal courts, provided that such rules do not "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right .... ." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). The
Seventh Circuit held that the right to recover attorney's fees under the Fees Act
was both "substantive" and "procedural," and thus a reading of Rule 68 to cut
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torney's fees which are recoverable by statute as part of the costs
of litigation are to be treated as costs in other contexts, such as
Rule 68. In Hutto v. Finney,' defendants, who were state em-
ployees, asserted an eleventh amendment 5 6 immunity claim regarding
the attorney's fees award imposed against them under the Fees Act.'
5 7
The eleventh amendment, by its terms, precludes extending the "ju-
dicial power" of the United States "to any suit in law or equity"
commenced against one of the states. 5 8 Under the rule of Ex Parte
Young, 5 9 actions for equitable relief, however, 'can be brought against
state officials acting in their state capacity. 60 The Supreme Court
in Hutto' granted the plaintiff's request.' 6' The Court found that
when Congress enacted the Fees Act, it had made attorney's fees
a "part of the costs.' 62 The Court noted that Fairmont Creamery
Co. v. Minnesota 6 had been correctly understood as implying that
there was no eleventh amendment immunity to the imposition of
costs. 164
Although Hutto appeared to resolve the question of whether at-
torney's fees are part of the costs, the issue reappeared in connection
with the timing of fee requests, which led to a split among the
circuit courts. Four circuit courts' 6' had held that since fees are
off fees awardable under the Fees Act would constitute a violation of the Rules
Enabling Act. 720 F.2d at 479. However, the Supreme Court did not address this
question in its majority opinion in Marek v. Chesny.
155. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. Xl. The Eleventh Amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.
Id.
157. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 689.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. X1. See generally Comment, Attorneys' Fees and the
Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1875 (1975).
159. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
160. Id. at 167.
161. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 689-93.
162. Id. at 695. The Court relied in part on the Senate Report of the Fees Act
which states: "[lit is intended that the attorneys' fees, like other items of costs,
will be collected either directly from the official, in his official capacity, from
funds of his agency or under his control, or from the State or local government
(whether or not the agency or government is a named party)." Id. at 694 (citing
S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5) (1976) (footnotes omitted)).
163. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70 (1927).
164. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 696 n.26.
165. Johnson v. Snyder, 639 F.2d 316, 317 (6th Cir. 1981). Similar disputes
yielded the same result in cases in the Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits. See
Gary v. Spires, 634 F.2d 772, 773 (4th Cir. 1980); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d
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statutorily included in costs a fee application is a motion for costs
under Rules 54(d)' 66 and 58167 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which do not limit the time in which those motions are available.
The Courts of Appeals for the First' 6 and Tenth' 69 Circuits,
however, held that fees cannot be costs, despite what Congress
provided, because fees are more difficult to calculate than other
costs. 70 Fee requests, therefore, would have to be made pursuant
to FRCP 59(e) within ten days after entry of judgment.'7 '
In White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security,
the Supreme Court resolved the dispute on the timing of fee requests
but not the question of whether attorney's fees are costs.'17  The
Court declined to hold expressly that provision for attorney's fees
as costs under the Fees Act means that postjudgment fee requests
constitute motions for "costs" under Rules 54(d) and 58, but merely
held that motions for attorney's fees should not be made under
Rule 59(e) with its ten day limitation.' 7 The Court thereby cast
doubt upon an issue that seemed to be clear-cut following the Hutto
decision, but did so without rebutting the proposition that fees are
costs. Courts have subsequently followed that interpretation.' 74
In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 75 the Supreme Court faced
the question of whether attorney's fees in civil rights cases are to
1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir.
1980).
166. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
167. Rule 58 sets forth the mechanism for entry on the judgment. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 58.
168. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697 (1st
Cir. 1980), reversed 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
169. See Glass v. Pfeffer, 657 F.2d 252 (10th.Cir. 1981).
170. White, 629 F.2d at 702; see Glass, 657 F.2d at 256-57.
171. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed yet another approach,
holding that fee requests are governed by local rather than federal rules. Obin v.
District No. 9, Int'l Ass'n. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574,
582-84 (8th Cir. 1981).
172. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
173. Id. at 454-55, n.17.
174. See Spray-Rite Service Corporation v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1247-
48 (7th Cir. 1982); Brown v. City of Palmetto, Georgia, 681 F.2d 1325 (lth Cir.
1982); cf. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 690 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982)
(fees are not part of "costs" as that term is used in local rules); Metcalf v. Borba,
681 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1982) ("fees" are not "costs" for the purposes of Rules
54(d) and 58).
In another context, the Second Circuit held that a release executed by the prevailing
party as to costs was also a release of attorney's fees. Brown v. General Motors
Corp., 722 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1983).
175. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
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be treated as costs for purposes of section 1927 of Title 28.176
Plaintiffs brought a class action suit in federal district court under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.177 After plaintiffs' counsel
repeatedly failed to comply with court orders on discovery and other
matters, the district court dismissed the action and awarded costs
and attorney's fees to the defendant under section 1927 of Title 28,
which makes counsel liable for excessive "costs' '7 T8 caused by vex-
atious behavior. Although section 1927 did not, at that time, spe-
cifically define "costs" to include fees, Title VII allowed fees "as
part of costs.' ' 79
The Court, upon an examination of section 1927's legislative
history, found that the costs referred to in section 1927 are the costs
deemed taxable under section 1920.810 The Court also noted that
section 1927 and the fee provisions of Title VII have different
purposes. The fee provisions of Title VII are "acutely sensitive" to
the merits of an action and to the policy behind the statute and
they treat plaintiffs and defendants differently, whereas section 1927
"does not distinguish between winners and losers, or between plain-
tiffs and defendants" but is concerned only "with limiting the abuse
of court processes."'' Litigants urging that Rule 68 not be found
to cut off attorney's fees have frequently cited this case as authority
for the proposition that civil rights attorney's fees are not "costs."
However, upon close inspection of Roadway Express, it is clear that
the Supreme Court was construing "costs" as used in section 1927
and not as used in the civil rights statutes.'8 2
This technical issue of whether attorney's fees in civil rights cases
were to be treated as costs for purposes of the Federal Rules, was
also litigated in connection with Rule 68 in a number of cases prior
176. Section 1927, as it read then, provided that:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court
of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously
may be required by the court to satisfy personally such excess costs.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1964).
As a result of the Court's decision in Roadway Express, Congress specifically
amended § 1927 so that it now requires the attorney "to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct." See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (West Supp. 1985).
177. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. at 754.
178. Id. at 755-56.
179. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k).
180. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. at 759-60.
181. Id. at 762.
182. Id. at 763.
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to Marek. One line of cases concluded that attorney's fees are costs,',"
while a second line of cases, culminating in Chesny v. Marek,
concluded that attorney's fees in civil rights cases are not costs. 84
B. Awards of Attorney's Fees and Public Policy Considerations
The second issue raised by the use of Rule 68 was whether cutting
off plaintiff's attorney's fees under Rule 68 to encourage settlement
85
conflicts with the public policy of encouraging the vindication of
183. In Fulps v. City of Springfield, 715 F.2d at 1092-93, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that Congress expressly included attorney's fees as part of the costs
under the Fees Act:
When Congress drafted 42 U.S.C. § 1988, it described attorney's fees
"as a part of the costs." Congress could have simply authorized the
recovery of attorney's fees, but it chose to go further and characterize
the fees as costs. Required, as we are, to construe the language of a
statute so as to avoid making any word meaningless or superfluous, we
conclude that Congress expressly characterized fees as costs with the
intent that the recovery of fees be governed by the substantive and
procedural rules applicable to costs.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Bitsouni v. Sheraton Hartford Corp., 33 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 894, 898 (D. Conn. 1983); Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F. Supp.
at 1156-58; Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 110, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Scheriff
v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. at 1260; Perkins v. New Orleans Athletic Club, 429 F. Supp. at 667.
184. 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985). In Pigeaud v.
McLaren, 699 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983), the plaintiff accepted an offer of one
dollar "plus all costs and expenses," which stated that it should not be "construed
as an admission of liability." Id. at 402. The Seventh Circuit held that, in view
of the rejection of liability, the plaintiff was not a prevailing party and thus could
not recover fees. Id. It then determined that costs in the context of a Rule 68
offer do not include attorney's fees because such fees were not specifically mentioned
by the Rule's draftsmen. Unless fees are expressly included as part of costs, they
are generally considered to have been excluded. Id. at 403. Moreover, the definition
of costs in Rule 54(d) does not include attorney's fees. Id. Illustrative of the
semantic quagmire that this kind of discussion can lead to is the fact that the
holding in Pigeaud (and, for that matter, in Chesny v. Marek) is inconsistent with
the Seventh Circuit's own earlier determinations in Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v.
Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1247-48 (7th Cir. 1982), and Bond v. Stanton, 630
F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980), in which the Seventh Circuit held that attorney's
fees are costs for the purpose of the timing of fee applications.
185. Writing in the context of Rule 68, Justice Powell stated:
On the other hand, parties to litigation and the public as a whole have
an interest- often an overriding one-in settlement rather than exhaustion
of protracted court proceedings. Rule 68 makes available to defendants
a mechanism to encourage plaintiffs to settle burdensome lawsuits. The
Rule particularly facilitates the early resolution of marginal suits in which
the defendant perceives the claim to be without merit, and the plaintiff
recognizes its speculative nature.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 363 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
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civil rights by providing for the payment of attorney's fees. 8 6 The
argument against the cutting off of attorney's fees, made most
forcefully by the Seventh Circuit in Marek, was that reading Rule
68 to bar recovery of fees for post-offer work would defeat the
Fees Act18 7 by forcing the plaintiff's attorneys to either personally
collect the post-offer fee from the plaintiff, or to provide post-offer
work free of charge.' 88 Such a situation might encourage attorneys
to accept inadequate offers of judgment more frequently out of the
fear of losing their fees, and thereby diminish the value of the Fees
Act. 189
Prior to Marek, several district court cases denied fees for post-
186. It is indisputable that there is a congressional policy which favors fee awards
as a means of encouraging the vindication of civil rights. Specifically, the SENATE
REPORT, supra note 120, at 2, described fee awards as an "essential remedy if
private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important
Congressional policies" which are contained in such laws. The SENATE REPORT
further states that "[ijf our civil rights laws are not to become mere hollow
pronouncements which the average citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the
traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in these cases." Id. at 6. Thus, the
legislative history indicates that the awarding of attorney's fees was seen as a means
to an end, that end being the protection of basic civil rights. However, it is also
clear that Congress did not intend the Fees Act to become a "lawyers relief bill"
encouraging attorneys to litigate frivolous cases to obtain fees. See 122 CONG. REC.
33,314 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); 122 CONG. REC. 35,127 (1976) (remarks
of Rep. Jordan) ("not a bill that we could term a food-stamp bill for lawyers").
During the House hearings on the bill that was ultimately to become the Fees
Act, Representative Seiberling of Ohio noted that the bill was certainly not calculated
to promote the interests of lawyers who make the wrong judgment or who make
an ineffective presentation or who are on the wrong side of a lawsuit. Award of
Attorneys' Fees: Hearing Before' the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1975); see, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 31,474, 31,830 (1976) (statements of Sen.
Allen); 122 CONG. REC. 31,832 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk); 122 CONG.
REC. 31,834 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
187. In Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,
105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985), the Seventh Circuit rejected the approach of reading Rule
68 "costs" to include attorney's fees under the Fees Act:
This approach, though in a sense logical, puts Rule 68 into conflict with
the policy behind section 1988. Section 1988 was intended to encourage
the bringing of meritorious civil rights actions, such as the present action,
which resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff of $60,000 for the death
of his decedent at the hands of the three police officers who are the
defendants .... The effectiveness of section 1988 would be reduced if
the rejection of a Rule 68 offer that turned out to be more favorable
than the judgment the plaintiff eventually received prevented the plaintiff
from getting any award of legal fees that accrued after the date of the
offer.
Id. at 478.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 478-79.
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offer work.19° In Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 19 1 the court for the
Northern District of California concluded that the purposes behind
the Fees Act are not violated when fees are cut off for post-offer
work. Anticipating the reasoning of Hensley, that attorneys should
not be compensated for unsuccessful work,'9 2 the Waters court con-
cluded that "[a]warding fees covering their pre-offer work to at-
torneys who settle cases through acceptance of an offer of judgment
advances the purposes underlying the fees provision."' 193 Thus, the
application of Rule 68 to bar recovery of post-offer fees did "not
unduly interfere" with the operation of the Fees Act since the post-
offer work did not provide a more favorable result to the plaintiff.
194
The result in Waters does indeed comport with the purposes of
the civil rights laws, which were designed to benefit the client rather
than the attorney. 195 When the plaintiff receives a Rule 68 offer
exceeding the amount of the actual judgment, he has, by definition,
been offered full relief since the best measure of the relief he is
entitled to is the relief that he actually obtains.
While it has been suggested that allowing Rule 68 to cut off fees
would force civil rights plaintiffs to accept improperly low settle-
ments, 196 the use of Rule 68 is just as likely to produce an offer
greater than the "real" value of the case, particularly in cases of
low damage awards. In calculating a Rule 68 offer, a defendant
must consider not only the minimum amount a jury is likely to
award, but also the cost of attorney's fees a plaintiff might recover
in a statutory fees case if the litigation is continued, as well as the
defendant's own attorney's fees and any inconvience. A Rule 68
offer is likely to incorporate these "nuisance value" considerations,
particularly if it is made early. Thus, in many cases, Rule 68 will
encourage the defendant to offer a windfall in excess of what the
plaintiff's claim is really worth, but less than the cost to the defendant
of litigating it. 197
190. Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. 1147, 1158-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bitsouni
v. Sheraton Hartford Corp., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 894, 898 (D. Conn.
1983); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 110, 114-15 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
191. 485 F. Supp. at 114-15.
192. 461 U.S. at 430.
193. 485 F. Supp. 114.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 113, 120.
196. Amicus Curiae Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. at 17-19, Marek v. Chesny, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
3012 (1985).
197. An example of this kind of offer can be found in Abrams v. Interco Inc.,
719 F.2d 23, 25, 26 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) where the defendant offered triple the
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Furthermore, Rule 68 provides a strong incentive for the defendant
to offer relief for the plaintiff earlier in the case. In this way, Rule
68 better serves the civil rights laws because it discourages plaintiffs
from persisting with litigation which will ultimately bring them smaller
recoveries and their attorneys larger fees.
C. The Propriety of Prejudgment Fee Negotiations
The third issue which arose both in the context of Rule 68 and
in general fee awards litigation relates to the ethical propriety of
simultaneously negotiating the fees and the merits of the case. Some
courts have been concerned about the possibility that defendant's
counsel might offer his adversary a "sweetheart deal" in which the
attorney agrees to minimal relief for his client on the merits claim
in exchange for a generous settlement for his own fees. The courts
have also indicated that simultaneous negotiation of the disbursement
of the fund from which the plaintiff would get his recovery and
the percentage of the fund which plaintiff's attorney would get for
his fee creates a conflict of interest between attorney and client. 98
In Prandini v. National Tea Co., 199 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit resolved this conflict by mandating that discussion
regarding the amount of the fee take place only after settlement on
the merits.2°° The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted
amount plaintiff might have been expected to recover, plus attorney's fees and
costs to the date of the offer.
In a case where a fair assessment of the plaintiff's damages would only be $1,000
or less, the defendant, by litigating the case, risks incurring plaintiff's fees which
are likely to be substantially higher than plaintiff's recovery and will certainly incur
his own fees as well. Since even minimal fees on a case going to trial would likely
be at least $5,000 for each party, assuming 50 hours of work at $100 per hour,
defendant might well be willing to make an offer of $3,000. That sum would be
higher than defendant's real estimation of the value of the case, since it would
include a sum for plaintiff's fees accrued to the date of the offer as well as a
contingency for the possibility of an increased verdict. Thus, a plaintiff whose
cause of action would really be worth only $1,000 might receive an early offer of
$3,000. Even after paying a third to his counsel, he would still have an extra
thousand dollars. In the absence of a device such as Rule 68, the defendant still
has a motive to make an offer beyond the inherent value of the case just to avoid
expenditure of his own attorney's time. Plaintiff's counsel, however, has a reduced
interest in advising his client to accept that offer, however, because his fees in a
statutory fee case are likely higher than his client's if this case is litigated to a
conclusion.
198. See e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015,
1020-21 (3d Cir. 1977).
199. 557 F.2d 1015.
200. Id. at 1021.
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a similar rule in Mendoza v. United States,20 although it refused
to absolutely prohibit settlements which did not follow the prescribed
method, stating that whether the existence of a "potential conflict"
required a trial court to reject a settlement would depend upon
examination of the circumstances under a "special scrutiny" stand-
ard.20 2 Thus the Mendoza court, skeptical of pre-settlement fee ne-
gotiation, was nevertheless unwilling to go as far as the absolute
prohibition in Prandini.03
The Supreme Court substantially undercut the Prandini approach
in 1982 when it stated, in White v. New Hampshire Department of
Employment Security,204 that:
In considering whether to enter a negotiated settlement, a defend-
ant may have good reason to demand to know his total liability
from both damages and fees. Although such situations may raise
difficult ethical issues for a plaintiff's attorney, we are reluctant
to hold that nd resolution is ever available to ethical counsel. 20 5
This pronouncement, although dictum, contemplates that the parties
should settle fees between themselves, if possible.
The Prandini decision has been criticized by commentators as being
impractical and inhibitive of settlements. 206 The Third Circuit itself
201. 623 F.2d at 1352-53, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). Mendoza was a class
action school desegregation suit.
202. Id. at 1353. The Ninth Circuit further noted that while it would "rarely
be an abuse of discretion" for the court to reject such a settlement proposal,
rejection is not "automatically required." Id.
203. Id.
204. 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
205. 455 U.S. at 453-54 n.15.
206. See Calhoun, Attorney-Client Conflicts of Interest and the Concept of Non-
Negotiable Fee Awards Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 362-
67 (1984). The author states that it is unrealistic to believe that the parties negotiating
a settlement will not take into account the possibility of a statutory fee award,
even if attorney's fees are not discussed during negotiation of the merits of plaintiff's
claim. Id. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1207
(1982) (refusal to discuss fees until agreement on all other issues is final "is not
necessarily in anyone's interest if it inhibits favorable settlement offers"); Levin,
Practical, Ethical and Legal Considerations Involved in the Settlement of Cases in
which Statutory Attorney's Fees are Authorized, 14 CLEARNINGHOUSE REV. 515,
516-17 (1980); Note, Attorneys' Fees-Conflicts Created by the Simultaneous Ne-
gotiation and Settlement of Damages and Statutorily Authorized Attorneys' Fees
in a Title VII Class Action-Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3rd
Cir. 1977), 51 TEMP. L.Q. 799, 800 & n.12 (1978). The author states that the
bifurcated proceeding could cause defendants to depress recovery figures in ex-
pectation of further liability. Comment, Settlement Offers Conditioned Upon Waiver
of Attorneys' Fees: Policy, Legal, and Ethical Considerations, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
793, 805 n.90 (1983) (survey of district court judges in Third Circuit demonstrates
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acknowledged that Prandini may be "more honored at the breach. '207
Since the Supreme Court's White decision in 1982, the trend has
clearly been away from an absolute prohibition on the fee settlement
negotiation.
20 8
A more difficult problem arises in the case of the so-called "con-
ditional offer" in which the defendant's attorney asks his adversary
to waive his fees altogether as a condition of the settlement award.
This question was bitterly contested and is now before the Supreme
Court for resolution in Jeff D. v. Evans.20 9
The Bar of the City of New York delivered a divided ethics
opinion, 2 0 holding that where a defendant offers to settle a case
with a plaintiff who is represented by an attorney from a public
interest group, and the offer is conditioned upon a waiver of at-
torney's fees, such an offer is unethical.2 1 ' This opinion was rejected,
however, by other Bar Associations who declined to establish such
lack of vitality of the Prandini rule, noting that "some of the judges interviewed
suggested that White v. New Hampshire . . . may have modified or overruled
Prandini") [hereinafter cited as Waiver of Attorney's Fees].
207. El Club Del Barrio, Inc. v. United Comm. Corp., 735 F.2d 98, 101 n.3
(3d Cir. 1984).
208. In addition to White and Moore several other circuits have implicitly or
explicitly permitted fee negotiation. See Lazar v. Pierce, 757 F.2d 435, 437-39 (1st
Cir. 1985) (plaintiff appeals district court denial of motion to reopen issue of
attorney's fees); Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d at 477-78, rev'd on other grounds,
105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 722 F.2d 1009, 1012 (2d
Cir. 1983) (in action for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, court found
plaintiff could waive his attorney's claim to fees); Gram v. Bank of Louisiana,
691 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1982) (settlement of Truth in Lending Act action); Chicano
Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980) (after settlement,
plaintiffs make motion for award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988,
2000e-5(k)).
209. Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct.
2319 (1985).
210. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the New York City Bar
Ass'n, Op. 80-94, 36 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 507 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics). After the comments by the Supreme Court in White
v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, the committee still reached
the same conclusion but recognized that a defendant needed to have some idea of
his ultimate exposure by allowing defense counsel to request from plaintiff's counsel
data on the number of hours they expected to work and their hourly rate. Both
the original Ethics Opinion and its successor contained vigorous dissents. Committee
on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the New York City Bar Ass'n, Op. 82-80,
N.Y.L.J. December 9, 1983, at 4, col. I. The District of Columbia Bar Legal
Ethics Committee, Op. 147, reprinted in 113 THE DAILY WASHINGTON LAW RE-
PORTER, February 27, 1985, at 389, reached the same conclusion as to conditional
offers but was unwilling to find that "offers of a single sum" were unethical.
211. Committee on Professional Ethics, supra note 210, at 511.
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a prohibition on conditional offers, 2  and has been criticized by at
least one basically sympathetic commentator."t 3
Ethical concerns over prejudgment negotiations and conditional
offers were also raised in connection with Rule 68 when plaintiffs
made lump sum offers which included attorney's fees.2"4 It was
argued that when the offer is made in a lump sum, a conflict may
arise between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's counsel over how much
of the lump sum each party is to receive.2"5 However, the lump sum
has the advantage of eliminating the possibility of the "sweetheart
settlement," whereby a fee arrangement between the defendant and
the plaintiff's attorney does not fairly address the plaintiff's best
interests2 '1 6 when a lump sum is offered, the defendant's counsel will
212. State of Georgia Disciplinary Board Opinion 39 (July 20, 1984). A panel
of attorneys appointed by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia rejected the Prandini approach and called for a case by case approach.
See Final Subcommittee Report of the Committee [of the District of Columbia
Circuit] on Attorney's Fees, D.C.B. Rep., August/September 1984, at 4, 5-6.
213. Waiver of Attorney's Fees, supra note 206, at 810-13.
214. In a suit where fees can be recovered, a defendant can structure his offer
in only two ways-the offer can be for either a sum of money "with costs" or
for a sum "plus costs" accrued as of the date of the offer. Where attorney's fees
are part of the costs, the offer constitutes an offer to pay a sum of money plus
whatever taxable costs and fees have accrued to the date of the offer. This creates
no ethical problem because the funds for the client and his counsel are separable.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, took
the position that in order to be effective, a Rule 68 offer had to break the offer
into specific sums or, at least, a specific sum of money plus costs for the plaintiff
and fees for his counsel. Justice Powell concluded that a Rule 68 offer in a case
where attorney's fees were available as part of the costs must set forth specific
sums for merits and costs. 450 U.S. at 362-65 (Powell, J., concurring). However,
Justice Powell did not cite any direct authority for this contention and several
courts have specifically declined to follow him on this point. See Pigeaud v. McLaren,
699 F.2d at 403; Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. at 1158.
Rule 68 offers may also be made for a sum of money "inclusive" of fees and
costs. This type of offer consists of a flat sum which, if accepted, would satisfy
all of plaintiff's claims against the defendant. This is the format of the offers in
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 348-49 n.2; Marek v. Chesny, 105
S. Ct. at 3015; Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. at 1151.
215. Plaintiffs argued in Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d at 477-78, and Lyons v.
Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. at 1158, that offers inclusive of attorney's fees were
unethical and ineffective.
216. "Sweetheart contract" is a term used in the labor field; it is defined as a
"[dierogatory term used to describe a contract between a union and an employer
in which concessions are granted to one or to the other for the purpose of keeping
a rival union out." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (5th ed. 1979). The term is
also used in the context of cases in which the defendant pays the plaintiff's lawyers,
and particularly agrees to pay counsel for the class a fee up to a certain maximum
set by the court. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir.
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not offer a specified amount to be paid to the plaintiff's counsel.
Those courts which specifically ruled on the ethical propriety of
lump sum Rule 68 offers concluded that such offers were proper."1 7
V. Marek v. Chesny: Costs Under Rule 68
Include Attorney's Fees
Marek v. Chesny 18 involved three police officers who shot and
killed Chesny's son during a call to investigate a domestic disturbance.
Chesny brought suit in federal court under section 1983219 and under
state tort theories.220 Several months prior to trial the petitioners
made a Rule 68 offer of settlement "for a sum, including costs
now accrued and attorney's fees of one hundred thousand ($100,000)
dollars."22
1977). In these types of actions, there is a strong possibility that fee agreements
will be made which do not fairly represent the interests of the plaintiff, but rather
benefit the plaintiff's lawyer.
217. Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d at 477-78. Although Chesny was reversed on
other grounds, this portion of the opinion remains good law. Marek v. Chesny,
105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985). The Chesny court noted that an arrangement under Rule
68 whereby the lawyer is to receive a fixed share of any damages awarded, plus
the attorney's fees awarded by the court, would present the same issues as any
other case in which the plaintiff and lawyer do not specify a figure beforehand.
And, as is done in all other unspecified fee cases, if the plaintiff felt the lawyers
were taking too much, the plaintiff could ask the court to arbitrate the dispute.
Id. at 478; see Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020-21 (3d Cir.
1977) (in assessing request of class counsel for court approval of statutorily au-
thorized attorney's fees, court had duty to see that arrangement was, and appeared,
fair).
In Lyons v. Cunningham, the district court concluded that lump sum offers were
permissible, but found ethical problems where the offer set out a specific sum for
fees. 583 F. Supp. at 1158. This portion of the Lyons opinion was arguably
undermined by the Supreme Court in Marek v. Chesny when it ruled that a
defendant could make an effective offer which set out a specific amount for costs
including attorney's fees. See infra notes 233-40 and accompanying text for a more
complete discussion of this principle.
218. 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985).
219. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
220. Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3014.
221. The full language of the offer was "[p]ursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68, the defendants Jeffery Marek, Thomas Wadycki and Lawrence Rhode,
hereby offer to allow judgment to be taken against them by the plaintiff for a
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Chesny did not accept the offer and at trial recovered a verdict
of $60,000.222 After trial, he requested a total of $171,692.47 in
costs, including attorney's fees."' Defendants. contended that their
Rule 68 offer, which had not been exceeded by the court's judgment,
precluded an award of attorney's fees for time expended after the
offer. 224 The district court agreed with the defendants and awarded
fees to the plaintiff only for the time expended up to the date of
the offer-a total of $32,000.225
Chesny appealed, and the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit
Judge Posner, reversed.2 26 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the
Rule was "little known" and little used, and that to interpret it to
bar a prevailing plaintiff from recovery of his full fee under the
Fees Act "cuts against the grain" of the Fees Act.227 The Seventh
Circuit declined to follow the District Court's "rather mechanical
linking up of Rule 68 and section 1988. ' ' 221 In a phrase that would
echo throughout each side of this dispute, Judge Posner commented
that this would force plaintiffs' attorneys in civil rights cases to
"think very hard" before rejecting even an inadequate offer because
it could cost both their clients and themselves a great deal. 229
On June 25, 1985, the Supreme Court, in a decision written by
Chief Justice Burger, reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that
Rule 68 cuts off attorney's fees not only under the Fees Act, but
presumptively under numerous other federal statutes as well. 230 A
lengthy dissent by Justice Brennan, in which Justices Marshall and
Blackmun concurred, criticized not only the Court's reasoning but
also the implications of the majo'ity opinion."'
The majority opinion states that the Court had been requested to
consider only two issues: (1) whether the "offer was valid under
Rule 68;" and (2) "whether the term 'costs' in Rule 68 includes
attorney's fees awardable under the [Fees Act].1"232 However, the
sum, including costs now accrued and attorney's fees, of One Hundred Thousand
($100,000) Dollars." Brief for Petitioners, at 4, Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012
(1985).
222. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. at 3014.
223. Id..
224. Id.
225. Chesny v. Marek, 547 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Il1. 1982).
226. Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983).
227. Id. at 478-79.
228. Id. at 478.
229. Id. at 479.
230. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985).
231. Id. at 3019-35.
232. Id. at 3015-16.
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opinion resolves, either directly or indirectly, many issues which had
been raised in the earlier Rule 68 cases and gives Rule 68 a far
broader reach than it had before.
A. Lump Sum Offer is Valid Under Rule 68
First, the Supreme Court found, as had the court of appeals, 233
that the lump sum offer was valid.23 4 The Court thus rejected the
position suggested by the respondents and by Justice Powell in Delta
Air Lines235 that an effective offer had to be broken into separate
sums: the amount being offered for the substantive claim and the
amount for the costs included in the offer.236 The Supreme Court
emphasized that "the critical feature" of that portion of the Rule
is that the offer be one which "allows judgment to be taken against
the defendant for both the damages caused by the challenged conduct
and the costs then accrued. "237 Where costs are included in the offer
or where a specific amount is offered for costs,238 and the plaintiff
233. Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d at 476-77. Plaintiffs argued that the offer was
invalid because it did not provide for separate sums in the offer for the liability
award and for the fees and costs award. Circuit Judge Posner, writing for the
Seventh Circuit, rejected that theory and found the offer in Marek to be a valid
one, noting that if such an offer were invalid, many defendants would be unwilling
to make a binding settlement offer, thereby leaving them open to an undetermined
fee award. Id.
234. 105 S. Ct. at 3016.
235. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 365 (Powell, J., concurring).
236. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. at 3016. The Court was undoubtedly right
in reaching this conclusion. Justice Powell's reading of Rule 68 was rejected by
every lower court which considered it. See Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d at 477;
Pigeaud v. McLaren, 699 F.2d at 403; Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. at
1158-59. However, it did receive some support in the law reviews. See Branham,
supra note 110, at 353. Justice Powell himself in his concurring opinion, while
still contending that it was "the better practic .or the offer of judgment expressly
to identify the components," joined the majority opinion and gracefully bowed to
the necessity for "a clear interpretation of Rule 68" because of the great public
interest in the settlement of cases. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. at 3019 (Powell,
J., concurring).
237. Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3015 (emphasis in original).
238. While approving of such a "bifurcated" offer, the Marek Court did not
address the issue of how such an offer, if rejected, would be compared to the
ultimate verdict received by the plaintiff. For example, if a defendant making an
offer guessed correctly about the amount of the liability on the merits but wrongly
as to the amount of the costs, including fees, would the judgment exceed the offer?
Conversely, if the defendant offered $40,000 on the merits and $10,000 for costs
including fees and the plaintiff recovered $42,000 on the merits but only $5,000
in costs and fees for a total recovery of $47,000 would the judgment exceed the
offer? There are of course several different ways such a bifurcated offer could
end up being played out but there is no case law as to how the comparison between
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accepts the offer, the judgment will, of course, include the costs.
However, even if the offer does not specifically include costs or if
an amount is not specifically set aside for costs, the court entering
judgment will include an additional amount to cover the costs accrued
to the date of the offer. 23
9
The Court announced the rule that:
[I]t is immaterial whether the offer recites that costs are included,
whether it specifies the amount the defendant is allowing for costs,
or for that matter, whether it refers to costs at all. As long as
the offer does not implicitly or explicitly provide that the judgment
not include costs, a timely offer will be valid. 240
Thus, only if the plaintiff specifically excludes costs from his offer
will an offer be invalid. The rationale expressed for this conclusion
was purely practical. The Supreme Court recognized, as had the
Seventh Circuit,4 that defendants who cannot make lump sum offers
will be reluctant to make settlement offers which expose them to
whatever liability for fees the court might ultimately fix. 242 It is
reasonable to assume that the Court went into such detail to give
guidance to counsel as to how to make a valid offer.
B. Costs Under Rule 68 Include Attorney's Fees
The second question before the Court was whether the term
"costs" in Rule 68 includes attorney's fees awardable as part of
the costs under the Fees Act.243 The Court looked to the history of
the Federal Rules to determine what the drafters of the Rules intended
the word "costs" to mean. 2"4 Specifically, the Court looked not to
the offer and the judgment would be made. Perhaps the fairest method would be
to compute the total amount of the offer with the total amount of the recovery
but there is no certainty that the courts will follow this approach. This uncertainty
suggests that a plaintiff would be better advised to make a lump sum offer. Indeed,
aside from the dubious practice of creating dissension between plaintiff and his
counsel by manipulating the sums in the offer, defendant would have little to gain
by making such a bifurcated offer.
239. Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3015-16.
240. Id. at 3016.
241. In Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d at 476-77, Judge Posner, writing for the
Seventh Circuit, cited Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in Delta Air Lines,
Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 379 n.5 (1981) for the proposition that "many a
defendant would be unwilling to make a binding settlement offer on terms that
left it exposed to liability for attorney's fees in whatever amount the court might
fix on motion of the plaintiff."
242. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. at 3016.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 3017. When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in
19861
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
the sparse history of Rule 68 but to Rule 54, which sets forth the
normal federal practice as to costs. 2 45 The Court noted that by 1938,
the year of the enactment of the Federal Rules, a significant number
of federal statutes had been enacted which created exceptions to the
American Rule. For example, the Clayton Act 246 provided that at-
torney's fees be part of the costs recoverable, as did the Securities
Acts of 1933,247 and 1934,248 the Communications Act of 1934249 and
the Railway Labor Act.25 0 The Court stated that the drafters of the
Federal Rules were "fully aware of these exceptions to the American
1938, federal statutes had been authorizing and defining awards of costs to prevailing
parties for over eighty-five years. Id. at 3016. The Court stated that "[u]nlike in
England, such 'costs' generally had not included attorney's fees; under the 'American
Rule,' each party had been required to bear its own attorney's fees." Id.
245. Id. at 3017.
246. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1934). Section 15 provides in part: "Any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court . . .and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." Id.
247. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1934). Section 77k(e) provides in part:
The suit authorized under subscctiou (a) of this section may be to recover
such damages as shall represent the difference between the amount paid
for the security . . . and (1) the value thereof as of the time such suit
was brought .... [T]he court may, in its discretion, require an under-
taking for the payment of the costs of such suit, including reasonable
attorney's fees.
Id.
248. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1934). Section 78i(e) provides in part:
Any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation
of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section, shall be liable to any person
who shall purchase or sell any security at a price which was affected
by such act or transaction, and the person so injured may sue .... In
any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking
for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant.
Id.
249. 47 U.S.C. § 407 (1934) provides in part:
If a carrier does not comply with an order for the payment of money
within the time limit in such order, the complainant, or any person for
whose benefit such order was made, may file in the district court of the
United States ... a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which
he claims damages . . . . If the petitioner shall finally prevail, he shall
be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as a
part of the costs of the suit.
250. 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1926) provides in part:
If a carrier does not comply with an order of a division of the Adjustment
Board within the time limit in such order, the petitioner, or any person
for whose benefit such order was made, may file in the District Court
of the United States . . . a petition .... If the petitioner shall finally
prevail he shall be allowed a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be taxed and
collected as a part of the costs of the suit.
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Rule,""5 ' since the Advisory Committee's Note on Rule 54(d) cited
twenty-five statutes involving costs, of which "no fewer than 11
allowed for attorney's fees as part of costs. ' 25 2 Then, turning an
omission into a policy statement, Chief Justice Burger wrote that
in view of "the importance of costs to the Rule," the fact that the
drafters of Rule 68 had not defined costs for purposes of that Rule,
makes it "very unlikely that this omission was mere oversight" and
that "the most reasonable inference is that the term 'costs' in Rule
68 was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the
relevant substantive statute or other authority. ' 253
The Court stated further "absent Congressional expressions to the
contrary, where the underlying statute defines costs to include at-
torney's fees, we are satisfied such fees are to be included as costs
for purposes of Rule 68."254 The Court thus found that Rule 68
cuts off fee awards not only in civil rights cases but, presumptively,
in numerous other federal statutes as well.
Had the Court chosen to look to the legislative history of the
Fees Act, it would have found further justification for its conclu-
sion that Rule 68 cuts off the Fees Act. Although the legislative
history of the Fees Act is void of any reference to Rule 68, there
is strong, if oblique evidence that Congress chose to make fees
part of costs without regard for the Eleventh Amendment im-
munity applicable to the states. 25  That, in fact, was the rationale of
251. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. at 3017.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. The legislative history of the Fees Act provides some guidance for a definition
of "costs." Although there is no reference to Rule 68 in the extensive legislative
record contained in subcommittee hearings, debates on the House and Senate floors,
and in House and Senate reports, these sources indicate that Congress intended
"costs" to include attorney's fees, at least where the defendant is a state body or
official. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 694. Congressional concern arose over the questicn
of whether states and state employees can assert eleventh amendment defenses
against claims for fee awards. Id. The amendment explicitly precludes extending
the "judicial power" of the United States "to any suit in law or equity" commenced
against one of the states. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment did not bar
injunctions against state officials acting in their official capacity. That left open
the question of whether the Eleventh Amendment prevented federal courts from
awarding attorney's fees, which are essentially money judgments; from state trea-
suries. See generally Comment, Attorneys Fees and the Eleventh Amendment 88
HARV. L. REV. 1875 (1975).
While Congress was evaluating the Fees Act prior to its enactment, the Supreme
Court decided in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), that similar provisions
for attorney's fees in the 1964 Civil Rights Act were enforceable against state
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Fulps' 6 and of the district court cases which concluded that the term
"costs," as used in Rule 68, included attorney's fees. 57 However,
had the Court chosen to rely upon the legislative history of the
Fees Act, its decision would have been limited to the interpretation
of the civil rights statutes. Litigation would have been necessary to
determine whether any of the dozens of other federal fee statutes,
under which fees are awarded as part of the costs, contain similar
legislative histories and, thus, whether the Rule would affect these
statutes. As with the Court's explanation of how to make a proper
offer, it is again easy to see the pragmatic reasons the Court reached
out for a broader result.
C. Policy Considerations
The Court's disposition of the "policy" disputes, which had so
burdened the lower courts, involves an element of pragmatism as
well. Although the application of Rule 68 could serve as a "dis-
incentive" to counsel to continue to litigate after the offer, the
Court found that such a "disincentive" was not contrary to the
legislative intent behind the Fees Act.258 The Court relied on the
defendants. Id. at 456-57. Congress relied on the Fitzpatrick holding to rebut the
argument that allowing fees against the state would violate the eleventh amendment.
122 CoNG. REC. 33315 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk); 122 CONG. REC. 35123
(1976) (remarks of Cong. Drinan). In addition, the Senate Report specifically cited
in a footnote to the Supreme Court's 1927 decision in Fairmont Creamery Co. v.
Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70 (1927), holding that the eleventh amendment did not prevent
the assessment of costs against states when it stated that, "it is intended that the
attorneys' fees, like other items of costs, will be collected . . . from the official,
in his official capacity ..... " S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976)
(footnotes omitted).
In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. at 694-98, the court stated:
The Act imposes attorney's fees "as part of the costs." Costs have
traditionally been awarded without regard for the States' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity. The practice of awarding costs against the States goes
back to 1849 in this Court .... The Court has never viewed the Eleventh
Amendment as barring such awards, even in suits between States and
individual litigants.
Id. at 695.
256. Fulps v. City of Springfield, 715 F.2d 1088, 1091-95 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The
Supreme Court has held that the eleventh amendment is not a bar to the awarding
of attorney's fees, like other items of costs against State governments in civil rights
actions.") (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). Id. at 1093.
257. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
258. Marek at 3017-18. The Court stated:
Application of Rule 68 will serve as a disincentive for the plaintiff's
attorney to continue litigation after the defendant makes a settlement
offer. There is no evidence, however, that Congress, in considering [the
Fees Act], had any thought that civil rights claims were to be on a
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principle expressed in Hensley v. Eckerhart5 9 that the "degree of
success obtained" is the "most critical factor" in fixing a fee
award. 60 The Court further noted, in Marek, that a plaintiff would
obtain no benefit from work done after the offer. 6 The Court then
pointedly observed that the $139,692 in post-offer work done by
plaintiff's counsel in Marek had in fact resulted in a total recovery
to plaintiff and counsel of $8,000 less than the Rule 68 offer.2 62
The Court also discussed some of the philosophical implications
of Rule 68 and concluded that the Rule is "neutral, favoring neither
plaintiffs nor defendants. ' 263 The Court noted that while some plain-
tiffs would not recover fees for work done after the offer, others
would receive settlement sums which might not have been offered
otherwise or which might have been less but for the availability of
Rule 68.264 In addition, the Supreme Court, unlike the Seventh
Circuit, had no difficulty requiring plaintiffs to "think very hard"
before rejecting a reasonable Rule 68 offer. Rather, the Court stated
that this is precisely what Rule 68 contemplates. 265
Thus, the Court in effect decided, by omission, the issue of the
ethical propriety of making a lump sum offer, inclusive of fees and
costs. In fact, the Court stated that a valid Rule 68 offer could be
made either by a lump sum offer including fees or by an offer
specifically setting forth an amount for fees. 266 By approving both
forms of offers, the Court implicitly approved the ethics of each
type of offer.
different footing from other civil claims insofar as settlement is concerned.
Indeed, Congress made clear its concern that civil rights plaintiffs not
be penalized for 'helping to lessen docket congestion' by settling their
cases out of court.
Id.
259. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
260. Id. at 436.
261. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. at 3018. In Marek, the Court stated: "In a
case where a rejected settlement offer exceeds the ultimate recovery, the plaintiff-
although technically the prevailing party-has not received any monetary benefits
from the post-offer services of his attorney." Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.The Court further noted that "even for those who would prevail at trial,
settlement will provide them with compensation at an earlier date without the
burdens, stress, and time of litigation." Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 3016.
The problem of the "conditional offer," now before the Supreme Court in Jeff
D., in which tlhe plaintiff's counsel is asked to waive fees in exchange for relief
on the merits, is unlikely to arise under Rule 68 because of the Rule's particular
technical requirement that a valid offer include "costs." Defendants could, of
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While the Marek opinion, in one sense merely holds that defendants
can make Rule 68 offers either consisting of lump sums inclusive
of fees and costs or providing' specific sums for costs and liability,
its reasoning inherently rejects the position taken in Prandin 67 that
prejudgment negotiation is improper. Certainly, if the defendant can
make either a settlement offer of either a lump sum inclusive of
fees or of a specific sum for fees, plaintiffs' counsel should be able
to make a counter-offer. This is surely preferable to the two parties
stumbling blindly into a settlement through a series of offers.
Upon examination of the majority opinion, it is apparent that
the Marek Court's major concern was its pragmatic interest in
effectuating settlements. This is reflected in the Court's delineation
of what constitutes an effective offer. It is also reflected in the
Court's pragmatic decision to make Rule 68 presumptively applicable
to all cases involving fees which are awarded "as part of the costs"
and in the Court's sub-silentio rejection of an absolute prohibition
on prejudgment fee negotiation.
D. The Marek Dissent
If a pragmatic concern for effectuating settlement was the mo-
tivating factor for the majority, the dissent's2 68 primary concern was
course, attempt to bypass this requirement by including a nominal sum for costs
in the offer. However, the practicalities of Rule 68 could come into play to render
such an offer of dubious value. First, a court might term an offer of a purely
nominal sum which bears no relation to a reasonable fee as one which "implicitly"
seeks to exclude costs and is therefore invalid. Furthermore, if fees must be included
in the judgment obtained by the offeree for comparison with the offer, a prevailing
party would recover, as part of his judgment, fees for at least those hours expended
prior to the offer. The plaintiff's judgment would then contain both non-monetary
relief and a monetary sum for costs and fees. If a plaintiff were to make a Rule
68 offer which included only a nominal sum for fees, the costs and fees portion
of the judgment would considerably exceed the amount of that portion of the
offer. This alone might be grounds for a finding that the judgment exceeds the
offer. The offer would therefore prove ineffective in practice although valid in
form.
These considerations should cause defendants, in cases where the plaintiffs seek
only non-monetary relief but would be entitled to a fee award if successful, to be
sure either to include in the offer a sum which reasonably approximates the amount
of plaintiff's fees and costs accrued as of the date of the offer, or to make an
open-ended offer of relief "plus costs and fees." Neither type of offer will present
to plaintiff's counsel the ethical dilemma of asking him to waive his fees altogether,
but will comply with Rule 68.
267. Prandini, 557 F.2d at 1021.
268. Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3019.
One of the more remarkable aspects of the majority opinion in Marek is how
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the possiblity that variations in the cost provisions of the over one
hundred attorney's fees statutes could result in the inconsistent ap-
plication of Rule 68. Other objections were that the majority's
holding was "inconsistent with the history and structure" of Federal
Rules, that it would "undermine" the purposes behind the Fees
Act,2 69 that it would violate the limitations on the Court's rule-
making power contained in the Rules Enabling Act T0 and that it
was contradicted by recent attempts by Congress to change Rule
68.271
close it came to becoming the minority opinion. Three of the six justices joining
in the majority opinion reversed positions they had taken in prior concurring or
dissenting opinions.
Justice Powell had concurred only in result in Delta Air Lines because he felt
that a valid Rule 68 offer could be made only if the offer provided for separate
sums for liability and costs. 450 U.S. at 365-67 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell
joined in the majority opinion in Marek but stated that he still thought it the
"better practice" to "identify the components" expressly in the offer of judgment.
105 S. Ct. at 3019.
In Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Delta Air Lines in which Chief Justice Burger
joined, he argued that costs in Rule 68 did not include attorney's fees. 450 U.S.
at 377-79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In his concurrence in Marek, Justice Rehnquist
explained this change of position by stating that "[fQurther examination of the
question ... convinced [him] that this view was wrong." 105 S. Ct. at 3019.
The Justices in the minority were not totally consistent either. Justice Blackmun
joined in the dissent in Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3021-22, which relied in part upon
a section of the opinion in Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 768-69, from which he
had dissented.
269. 105 S. Ct. at 3019.
270. Id. at 3020; see supra note 154 and accompanying text.
271. Justice Brennan stated:
[Bloth Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United States have
been engaged for years in considering possible amendments to Rule 68
that would bring attorney's fees within the operation of the Rule. That
process strongly suggests that Rule 68 has not previously been viewed
as governing fee awards, and it illustrates the wisdom of deferring to
other avenues of amending Rule 68 rather than ourselves engaging in
"standardless judicial lawmaking."
Id. (citation omitted). However, bills have recently been proposed in Congress
which would drastically cut back on fee recoveries. In 1984, the Reagan Admin-
istration proposed a "Legal Fees Equity Act," which was introduced in both the
Senate, S. 2802, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S8466 (daily ed. June 27,
1984), and the House, H.R. 5757, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H5109
(daily ed. May 31, 1984). These bills have the support of the National Association
of Attorney's General whose report, CIVIL RIGHTs ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT
OF 1976, was introduced into the Congressional Record. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S8844-53 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). This 1984
legislation would, among other things, restrict eligibility for fees to those who had
obtained "significant relief," prohibit multiples or bonuses, permit a 25%o reduction
in the fee where there was an award of damages, and limit the hourly rates for
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1. Criticism of the "Plain Meaning" Analysis
A large portion of the lengthy dissent was devoted to disputing
the majority's "plain meaning" conclusion which equated "costs"
for purposes of Rule 68 with "costs" for purposes of the Fees
Act.272 While conceding that such an interpretation was, as Judge
Posner stated, "in a sense logical,"" Justice Brennan wrote that
the Court's conclusion in Marek contradicted the conclusion it had
reached on a similar issue in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper.2 74
The Court held in Roadway Express that a party could not recover
attorney's fees against an attorney who vexatiously extended the
litigation, even where the underlying statute provided for an award
of fees as part of the costs. 27" The Court feared the creation of a
"two-tier system of attorney sanctions" wherein attorneys who be-
haved improperly in cases where fees could have been awarded as
costs could have fees assessed against them, but attorneys who
behaved in this fashion in cases where "costs" were limited to their
traditional meaning could suffer a considerably less severe sanction.276
The dissent in Marek argued that the inconsistent result which the
Court had rejected in Roadway Express would take place under the
Court's reading of Rule 68 in Marek since the various fee statutes
had slightly different language, 277 and, therefore, would render dif-
ferent results.
awards against governmental bodies to $75 per hour. S. 2802, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S8498-500 (daily ed. June 27, 1984).
272. 105 S. Ct. at 3020-27.
273. Id. at 3020.
274. Id. at 3021.
275. 447 U.S. at 759-61. In Marek, Justice Brennan stated:
[W]hile the starting point in interpreting statutes and rules is always the
plain words themselves, "[tihe particular inquiry is not what is the abstract
force of the words or what they may comprehend, but in what sense
were they intended to be understood or what understanding they convey
when used in the particular act."
105 S. Ct. at 3020-21 (footnote omitted).
276. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. at 3021 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. at 762-63). The Court, in Roadway Express, stated "[tihere is no
persuasive justification for subjecting lawyers in different areas of practice to
differing sanctions for dilatory conduct. A court's processes may be as abused in
a commercial case as in a civil rights action." 447 U.S. at 763.
277. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S.Ct. at 3021-22. "The parties' arguments in this
case and in Roadway are virtually interchangeable, and our analysis is not much
advanced simply by the conclusory statement that the cases are different." Id. at
3022. However, the majority found so little difficulty with Roadway Express that
it disposed of the case in a footnote stating:
Respondents suggest that Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, requires a
different result. Roadway Express, however, is not relevant to our decision
[Vol. XIV
RULE 68 AND A TTORNEY'S FEES
2. Costs Under Rule 68
In addition, the dissent challenged the majority's conclusion that
costs under Rule 68 included attorney's fees for purposes of the
Fees Act: Justice Brennan reiterated the argument raised by the First
Circuit in White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment
Security,2 7 that since Rule 54(d) provides for costs to be automatically
taxed by the clerk upon one day's notice, and'since attorney's fees
can be fixed only by the court and not by the clerk, attorney's fees
are therefore not costs. IThus, the dissenters in Marek concluded
that Rule 68 cannot include attorney's fees.279 This argument, how-
ever, was rejected by the Court, at least implicitly, through its
reversal of White. 20
The dissent noted that where the Federal Rules "intended to
encompass attorneys fees" they did so "explicitly, ' 28 ' pointing to
eleven different provisions of the Federal Rules where sanctions
specifically included fees.12  However, the sections to which Justice
today. In Roadway, attorney's fees were sought as part of costs under
28 U.S.C. § 1927, which allows the imposition of costs as a penalty on
attorneys for vexatiously multiplying litigation. We held in Roadway
Express that § 1927 came with its own statutory definition of costs, and
that this definition did not include attorney's fees. The critical distinction
here is that Rule 68 does not come with a definition of costs; rather,
it incorporates the definition of costs that otherwise applies to the case.
Id. at 3017 n.2. (citation omitted).
278. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 699
(1st Cir. 1980) (attorney's fees, as opposed to costs, must be resolved either before
entry of final judgment, or after entry of final judgment within such time limits
as apply to appropriate motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e)), rev'd
on other grounds, 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
279. Marek v, Chesny, 105 S. Ct. at 3022. The Firit Circuit in White also stated
that while fees, "like routine costs, are ... somewhat ancillary to the main dispute,
they are fully capable of engendering a major controverted claim .... The con-
siderations making it feasible to treat routine costs as an exception to final judgment
rules-the ease of their computation and the fact that they almost never give rise
to dispute or appeal-plainly do not apply to Section 1988 attorney's fees." White,
629 F.2d at 703.
280. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
281. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. at 3023.
282. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (signing of pleadings, motions, or other papers
in violation of the Rule), 16(f) (noncompliance with rules respecting
pretrial conferences), 26(g) (certification of discovery requests, responses,
or objections made in violation of Rule), 30(g)(l) (failure of party giving
notice of a deposition to attend), 30(g)(2) (failure of party giving notice
of a deposition to serve subpoena on witness), 37(a)(4) (conduct neces-
sitating motion to compel discovery), 37(b) (failure to obey discovery
orders), 37(c) (expenses on failure to admit), 37(d) (failure of party to
attend at own deposition, serve answers to interrogatories, or respond
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Brennan refers are part of an entirely different scheme and typically
do not provide for awards of "costs," but sanctions in the form
of "reasonable expenses," including attorney's fees, incurred by the
parties' misconduct.283 The drafters of those Rules clearly intended
to provide flexibility for the Court's fixing of sanctions so as to
include attorney's fees and other types of "expenses" not covered
under the ordinary meaning of "costs."
The dissent next argues that the majority's reading of Rule 68's
usage of the word "costs" is not only unsupported by past un-
derstanding of that phrase,2 84 but, if read in accordance with a "plain
language" approach to include attorney's fees recoverable under the
Fees Act, would logically suggest that the prevailing plaintiff in a
civil rights case who fails to get a court judgment exceeding an
offer, not only will be precluded from collecting his own fees, but
will be required to shoulder the post-offer fees of the defendant285-
a conclusion squarely at odds with the legislative intent of the Fees
Act and the prevailing case law.286
There is, however, a solution to this problem which would allow
Rule 68 to cut off fees without forcing the plaintiff to pay the
defendant's post-offer attorney's fees. A Rule 68 offer that is not
exceeded by a court judgment has the effect of mandatorily shifting
to request for inspection), 37(g) (failure to participate in good faith in
framing of a discovery plan), 56(g) (summary judgment affidavits made
in bad faith).
Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3023 n.ll.
283. For example, Rule 11 directs the court to impose "an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
284. The dissent argues that there is relatively little precedent for such a reading
because neither the courts nor the attorneys have consistently read it that way.
Rule 68 has been in effect for nearly half a century, and since there has not been
a practice among the defense bar of seeking to shift or reduce fees by use of Rule
68, the trial lawyers have interpreted Rule 68 as referring only to ordinary cost
items recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3022. However,
a number of cases not cited by Justice Brennan reached the opposite conclusion.
See Bitsouni v. Sheraton-Hartford Corp., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 898,
902 (Conn. 1983); Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F. Supp. 1147, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
cf. Neal v. Berman, 576 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (suggesting in
dicta that had defendants made a written offer, court might have denied fees for
post-offer work); Spero v. Abbot Laboratories, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 321, 323 (N.D.
I11. 1975) (court reduced fee award when recovery was less than the defendant's
settlement offer).
285. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. at 3023-24.
286. Id. at 3024. Under the Fees Act, a prevailing defendant may recover an
attorney's fee only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass
or embarass the defendant. See supra note 2; see also S. REP. No. 1011, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5.
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the defendant's costs to the plaintiff."7 Fees, however, are a portion
of the costs award which, by statute and case law, are awardable
at the discretion of the court."' Thus, before a court could award
fees to a defendant following a Rule 68 offer which does not exceed
a court judgment, the court would be required to find that the
plaintiff's action was "unfounded, meritless, frivolous or vexatiously
brought." 2 9 Since Rule 68 comes into play only when there is a
plaintiff's verdict for less than the amount of the offer,29 the fee
component of the defendant's costs could be shifted to the plaintiff
only under the unlikely circumstance where the action was "unrea-
sonable, frivolous, meritless or brought for a vexatious purpose." 9g
However, it is rare that a plaintiff is awarded a judgment on an
unreasonable, frivolous or vexatious claim.
3. Inconsistent Application
The dissent's final argument about "costs" under Rule 68 is,
perhaps, its strongest. Attached to the opinion is an appendix292 listing
287. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
288. Section 1988 provides that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1982) (emphasis added).
289. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434
U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (citing United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d
359, 363 (3d Cir. 1975)).
290. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1981). In Delta,
the Court held that Rule 68 does not apply where judgment is entered against the
plaintiff offeree and in favor of the defendant offeror. Id.
291. The Court in Bitsouni v. Sheraton-Hartford Corp., 33' Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 898, discussed at length the policy considerations involved in shifting
to a prevailing plaintiff the defendant's attorney's fees accrued after an unbeaten
offer and rejected that conclusion although finding that Rule 68 did preclude the
plaintiff from recovering his post-offer fees from the defendant. In Association
for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 495, and Garrity
v. Sununu, 752 F.2d at 730-33, the losing defendants were denied fees they requested
under Rule 68. In each case, the court's ruling was dicta because it was determined
that the offers did not exceed the judgment obtained. However, in Quintel Corp.,
N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., 606 F. Supp. at 898, the court declined to shift fees as
well as costs.
Commentators have tended not to agree with these policy arguments. Compare
A Fundamental Incompatibility, supra note 58, at 976-77 (reading discretion into
the rule invites uncertainty and waste of litigant's time and money); A "New
Tool," supra note 109, at 900 (intent and specific language of Rule 68 require
that fees not be awarded to plaintiff); A Reconciliation, supra note 110, at 504-
06 (policy arguments are inconsistent with purposes of Rule 68); with Branham,
supra note 110, at 357-60 (stating that declining to shift the defendant's attorney's
fees to the plaintiff, while "perhaps understandable on policy grounds, is a dis-
concerting example of judicial improvisation"); Impact of Proposed Rule 68, supra
note 17, at 724 (civil rights actions should be exempt from proposed Rule 68).
292. Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. at 3035-39.
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over one hundred attorney's fees statutes in which Congress had
provided for the award of fees in some way. The Federal Rules, it
was stated, should be interpreted to provide for "uniform and
consistent application in all proceedings" in federal court. 93 The
variations in language in these statutes might result in Rule 68 not
cutting off fees in statutes where Congress has provided for "costs
and reasonable attorney's fee," but cutting off fees in statutes where
fees are awarded "as part of the costs." This, Justice Brennan
argued, will result in a "senseless patchwork" of fee shifting which
will result in plaintiffs being barred from recovering fees under some
statutes but not others, even though the same plaintiff might bring
his action under both statutes.2 94
While this argument has considerable merit, it represents an ar-
gument for legislative change rather than for reading those statutes
where Congress made fees recoverable "as part of the costs" as
meaning something other than what they say. Faced with the option
of disregarding the language of dozens of statutes in order to obtain
consistency, the majority cannot be faulted for choosing to follow
the statutory language. It also seems unrealistic to expect strict
uniformity in perhaps a hundred statutes drafted over a period of
more than half a century.
4. The Purpose of Civil Rights Statutes
In addition to the attack on the majority's reading of the technical
issue as to whether the term "costs" includes attorney's fees, the
dissent took exception to the Court's policy pronouncement that
reading Rule 68 to cut off fees was not contrary to the purpose
behind the civil rights statutes. 29 Congress, Justice Brennan wrote,
intended for attorney's fee entitlements under the Fees Act to be
determined by a "reasonableness standard," with the district court
having discretion to determine whether to award a fee and, if
awarded, the size of the fee. The mandatory nature of Rule 68's
application, however, results in the Rule becoming insensitive to the
293. Id. at 3024.
294. Id. This distinction may, however, be more theoretical than real. If a plaintiff
were to prevail on both statutes, he would probably end up recovering most of
his post-offer fees, since it is likely that much of the work done on the statute
that was affected by Rule 68 would have been necessary as well for the plaintiff's
success on the statute that was not affected by Rule 68.
295. Id. at 3027.
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merits of an action and to the policies behind it, 2 96 and thereby
contravening the purpose of attorney's fee entitlements.2 97
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Rule
68 is "neutral, favoring neither plaintiffs nor defendants." 2 98 It feared
that the Court's application of the Rule would encourage defendants
to make "low-ball" offers immediately after the suit is filed and
before the plaintiff has had the opportunity to conduct adequate
discovery.299 These fears are misplaced. As the majority opinion
noted, the plaintiff knows, or should be able to reasonably assess,
the amount of his damages caused by the challenged conduct and
he can reasonably ascertain the costs that have accrued to that
point.?° Only in rare instances, if ever, will a plaintiff need extensive
discovery to determine whether the offer reasonably reflects his
damages and, in those circumstances, the plaintiff can avail himself
of those provisions of the Federal Rules which allow for accelerated
discovery.
E. The Impact of Marek
In comparing the dissenting opinion with the majority opinion,
it seems clear that the majority has the better argument. While the
support the Court found in Rule 54(d) for its interpretation of Rule
68 is far from overwhelming, the dissent was unable to produce any
convincing history of either the Rules or the Fees Act which would
suggest a contrary result. The fact remains that in the Fees Act, as
well as in other statutes, Congress included fees "as part of the
costs," although it did not always express its reasons for doing so.
The chosen language of Congress should not be dismissed without
overwhelming contrary policy considerations. The policy argument
raised by both the majority and the dissent can certainly cut both
ways.
In assessing the importance of Marek to federal litigation, it is
296. Id.
297. Id. at 3027-28.
298. Id. at 3028-29.
299. Id. at 3029.
300. Id. at 3016. Justice Brennan also seemed to suggest that a reasonableness
test be applied to Rule 68 whereby the district court might conduct an appropriate
inquiry to determine whether a plaintiff had unreasonably rejected the offer. If
the district court found that the offer had been unreasonably rejected, it might
order that all or some of the plaintiff's post-offer fees not be reimbursed. Id. at
3027. However, Justice Brennan acknowleged that this was not the present law.
Id.
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difficult to overestimate the importance of the Court's ruling that
Rule 68 could cut off fees not only under the Fees Act, but also
under the dozens of federal statutes awarding fees which use identical
or similar language. One commentator has estimated that at least
one-third of all federal litigation involves statutes with similar lan-
guage providing for fee awards.3 0  i
After Marek, any defense counsel involved in federal civil litigation
presumably covered by Rule 68 would be foolish not to make a
Rule 68 offer. A defendant who has an interest in settling has
nothing to lose by making such an offer. If the offer is accepted,
the case is disposed of on satisfactory terms. If it is initially rejected,
the Rule's penalty provision provides some leverage to the defendant
in further settlement negotiations.0 2 If the offer is ultimately exceeded
at trial or the plaintiff loses altogether, the defendant is not damaged
by having made the offer. Finally, if the plaintiff wins a recovery
which is less than the offer, Rule 68 would diminish the plaintiff's
recovery. 303
The likelihood of the dire consequences for the civil rights laws
predicted in amicus briefs' ° 4 to the Court and in the public prints0 5
301. Professor Simon calculated that at least ninety statutes award "fees as part
of costs," Simon, supra note 110, at 88, and that statutes providing for an award
fee "as part of the costs" make up at least 37.8o of all federal civil cases. Id.
at 88-89 n.16. While his percentage figures are concededly imprecise, there is no
reason to doubt their accuracy. Indeed, in view of the Supreme Court's expansive
application of Rule 68, the actual percentage of cases affected may be even greater.
There has clearly been an explosive growth in the number of attorney's fees
statutes within the last decade. A compilation made by the Supreme Court in
Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. 240, 260 n.33 (1975), showed twenty-nine federal fee
statutes. A list affixed to the remarks of Congressman Drinan, 122 CONG. REC.
35123 (1976), shows fifty-five such statutes. A more recent compilation in Ruck-
elshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983), contains one hundred-fifty fee
shifting statutes. Accompanying this growth in fee statutes has been a vast increase
in the use of the civil rights statutes. In 1961, only two hundred seventy civil rights
suits were filed. THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, 1961, ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1961). By 1976, the number had increased
to 10,585. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, 1977, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1977) (this total excludes some 6,958 suits brought
by prisoners). By 1983, the figure had increased to 19,735 (alsQ excluding prisoner
suits). ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, 1983, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS (1983) Table 25.
302. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 9-11, 65-69 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Roger Baldwin
Foundation of the American Civil Liberties Union As Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 40, Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985) ("The proposed
construction of Rule 68 would, thus, effectively transform § 1988 from a key which
opens the courtroom door to a lock which bars entry").
305. See, e.g., Comments of Sheldon Elsen, head of the Federal Courts Committee
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is exaggerated. A competent attorney, in considering whether to
commence a civil rights suit, is unlikely to be deterred by the
somewhat improbable chance that his adversary might make an offer
which would be unacceptable to counsel and his client early enough
in the litigation to deny counsel a reasonable, if reduced, fee but
nevertheless would be greater than the ultimate recovery. If anything,
such an attorney might be encouraged to file suit in the expectation
that the significant benefits to the defendant from making an offer
will lead to an early Rule 68 offer.
Vi. Proposed Revisions of Rule 68
Rule 68 had no sooner returned to life than the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure began to propose
revisions of the Rule. Two proposals to revise Rule 68, both of
which were flawed, were put forth in 1983 and in 1984.
A. The 1983 Proposed Revision
The 1983 Proposed Revision3°0 would have made a large number
of changes, both major and minor, in the operation of Rule 68.
The time during which the offer remained open would have been
extended from ten days to thirty days. In addition, the terminology
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, reported in N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 5, 1984 at 1, col. 3 (if the Supreme Court were to find that Rule 68 did
cut off attorney's fees, the "consequences" would be not just "significant" but
"potentially devastating" and would be a "terrible body blow to the civil rights
bar and to civil rights litigation in general").
306. The 1983 Proposed Revision, supra note 17, at 361-63, provides:
At any time more than 30 days before the trial begins, any party may
serve upon an adverse party an offer, denominated as an offer under
this rule, to settle a claim for the money or property or to the effect
specified in his offer, and to enter into a stipulation dismissing the claim
or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly. The offer shall remain
open for 30 days unless a court authorizes earlier withdrawal. An offer
not accepted in writing within 30 days shall be deemed withdrawn.
Evidence of an offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to enforce
a settlement or to determine costs and expenses.
If the judgment finally entered is not more favorable to the offeree than
an unaccepted offer that remained open 30 days, the offeree must pay
the costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred by
the offeror after the making of the offer, and interest from the date of
the offer on any amount of money that a claimant offered to accept
to the extent such interest is not otherwise included in the judgment.
The amount of the expenses and interest may be reduced to the extent
expressly found by the court, with a statement of reasons, to be excessive
or unjustified under all of the circumstances. In determining whether a
final judgment is more or less favorable to the offeree than the offer,
the costs and expenses of the parties shall be excluded from consideration.
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would have changed from "offer of judgment" to "offer of set-
tlement."30 The proposal also included a revision to allow either
side to make an offer. 308
However, the major change proposed by the 1983 Revision was
that if the judgment should exceed the offer, the offeree would
"pay the costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees,
incurred by the offeror after the making of the offer .... "309* The
Court would be allowed, however, to reduce these "expenses" where
they were "excessive or unjustified under all the circumstances" or
to deny costs, expenses, and interest where the offer was made in
bad faith.310
Thus, under the terms of the 1983 Proposed Rule, an offeree,
including a defendant, who did not obtain a judgment exceeding
the proposed offer would find himself required to shoulder both
the offeror's "costs" and fees, unless he could demonstrate to the
court the injustice of such a burden.3 ' This rule would apply even
if the statute under which the action was brought did not provide
for fee shifting.3 2 The Proposed Revision of Rule 68 thus would
reverse the "American Rule ' 31 in cases where the offeree actually
won the suit. This would mean that in many instances the prevailing
party could end up owing money to the loser. This aspect of the
1983 Proposed Revision set off a storm of protest from the organized
bar. " It was subsequently withdrawn.
Costs, expenses, and interest shall not be awarded to an offeror found
by the court to have made an offer in bad faith.
The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a
subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to another has been
determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent
of the liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, any
party may make an offer of settlement under this rule, which shall be
effective for such period of time, not mort .,an 30 days, as is authorized
by the court. This rule shall not apply to class or derivative actions
under Rules 23, 23.1, and 23.2.
307. Id.
308. The ten day period was thought to be too short by the Advisory Committee.
98 F.R.D. 337, advisory committee note at 364.
309. Id. at 361-63.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See supra notes 111, 112 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE FEDERAL
BAR COUNCIL, reprinted in N.Y.L.J., Mar. 1, 1984, at 5, cols. 1-3; REPORT OF
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
reprinted in N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1984, at 7, cols. 1-2; REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON
FEDERAL COURTS OF THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION, reprinted in
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 7, 1984, at 1, col. 3; see also Impact of Proposed Rule 68, supra
note 17, at 719.
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B. The 1984 Proposed Revision
A new revision was proposed in 1984.111 While the 1983 Proposed
Revision went too far in the direction of strengthening Rule 68, the
1984 version went too far toward fatally weakening it.
315. The 1984 Proposed Revision, supra note 17, at 432, reads as follows:
At any time more than 60 days after the service of the summons and
complaint on a party but not less than 90 days (or 75 days if it is a
counter-offer) before trial, either party may serve upon the other party
but shall not file with the court a written offer, denominated as a [sic]
offer under this rule, to settle a claim for the money, property, or relief
specified in the offer and to enter into a stipulation dismissing the claim
or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly. The offer shall remain
open for 60 days unless sooner withdrawn by a writing served on the
offeree prior to acceptance by the offeree. An offer that remains open
may be accepted or rejected in writing by the offeree. An offer that is
neither withdrawn nor accepted within 60 days shall be deemed rejected.
The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a
subsequent offer. Evidence of an offer is not admissible except in pro-
ceedings to enforce a settlement or to determine sanctions under this
rule.
If, upon a motion by the offeror within 10 days after the entry of
judgment, the court determines that an offer was rejected unreasonably,
resulting in unnecessary delay and needless increase in the cost of the
litigation, it may impose an appropriate sanction upon the offeree. In
making this determination the court shall consider all of the relevant
circumstances at.the time of the rejection, including (1) the then apparent
merit or lack of merit in the claim that was the subject of the offer,
(2) the closeness of the questions of fact and law at issue, (3) whether
the offeror had unreasonably refused to furnish information necessary
to evaluate the reasonableness of the offer, (4) whether the suit was in
the nature of a "test case," presenting questions of far-reaching importance
affecting non-parties, (5) the relief that might reasonably have been
expected if the claimant should prevail, and (6) the amount of the
additional delay, cost, and expense that the offeror reasonably would be
expected to incur if the litigation should be prolonged.
In determining the amount of any sanction to be imposed under this
rule the court also shall take into account (1) the extent of the delay,
(2) the amount of the parties' costs and expenses, including any reasonable
attorney's fees incurred by the offeror as a result of the offeree's rejection,
(3) the interest that could have been earned at prevailing rates on the
amount that a claimant offered to accept to the extent that the interest
is not otherwise included in the judgment, and (4) the burden of the
sanction on the offeree.
This rule shall not apply to class or derivative actions under Rules
23, 23.1, and 23.2.
Public hearings were held on the 1984 Proposed Revision in Washington D.C.
on February 1, 1985, Hearings on the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil,
Criminal and Appellate Procedure and the Proposed Amendments to the Rules
Governing Proceedings Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (February 1, 1985) [here-
inafter cited as Washington Hearing], and San Francisco on February 21, 1985,
Hearings on the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil, Criminal
and Appellate Procedure and the Proposed Amendments to the Rules Governing
Proceedings Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (February 21, 1985) [hereinafter cited
as San Francisco Hearing].
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The 1984 Proposed Revision extends the time that the offer will
remain open to sixty days.31 6 It also provides that the offer cannot
be made (1) until sixty days after service of the summons and
complaint and (2) prior to ninety days before trial.317 The expressed
A number of organizations opposed the revision, including: the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, Washington Hearing, supra, at 26-32 (Testimony
of Sheldon Elsen and Michael W. Schwartz); the National Association of Railroad
Trial Counsel, Washington Hearing, supra at 32-43 (Testimony of Stephen A.
Trimble); The Federal Courts Committee of the New York State Bar Association,
Washington Hearing, supra, at 55-61 (Testimony of Bernard A. Friedman); the
Alliance for Justice, Washington Hearing, supra, at 102-22 (Testimony of Laura
Macklin); the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People-Legal
Defense Fund, Washington Hearing, supra, at 122-37 (Testimony of Barry Gold-
stein); the American Civil Liberties Union, Washington Hearing, supra, at 138-49
(Testimony of E. Richard Larson); San Francisco Hearing, supra, at 90-94 (Tes-
timony of Fred Okrand); the Federal Courts Committee of the California State
Bar Association, San Francisco Hearing, supra, at 3-12, 16-21 (Testimony of Gilbert
Ross Sorota and James Wagstaffe); the Committee on Civil Procedure of the
Arizona State Bar, San Francisco Hearing, supra, at 27-39 (Testimony of John P.
Frank); the San Francisco Women Lawyers Alliance, San Francisco Hearing, supra,
at 46-57 (Testimony of Elizabeth D. Laporte); and the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Education Fund, San Francisco Hearing, supra, at 76-90 (Testimony
of Morris Bailer). The only organization to appear to support the 1984 Proposed
Revision was the International Association of Insurance Counsel, San Francisco
Hearing, supra, at 137-53 (Testimony of Perry L. Fuller).
A number of speakers felt that the 1984 Proposed Revision created problems
under the Rules Enabling Act. See Washington Hearing, supra, at 25-29 (Testimony
of Michael L. Schwartz); Washington Hearing, supra, at 32-41 (Testimony of
Stephen A. Trimble); Washington Hearing, supra, at 140-45 (Testimony of E.
Richard Larson). Speakers also expressed concern that the courts would have
considerable difficulty in determining whether the offeree had "reasonably" rejected
the offer, which might result in satellite litigation. See Washington Hearing, supra,
at 6-32 (Testimony of Sheldon Elsen); Washington Hearing, supra, at 123-37
(Testimony of Barry Goldstein); Washington Hearing, supra, at 118-22 (Testimony
of Laura Macklin); San Francisco Hearing, supra, at 16-21 (Testimony of James
Wagstaffe); San Francisco Hearing, supra, at 32-34 (Testimony of John P. Frank);
San Francisco Hearing, supra, at 55-57 (Testimony of Elizabeth D. Laporte); San
Francisco Hearing, supra, at 101-02 (Testimony of Fred Okrand); San Francisco
Hearing, supra, at 114-21, 131-33 (Testimony of Judith Resnick).
The 1984 Proposed Revision was further criticized as giving too much power to
defendants which could be used to coerce plaintiffs into agreeing to unfavorable
settlements. Washington Hearing, supra, at 106-18 (Testimony of Laura Macklin);
Washington Hearing, supra, at 140-42 (Testimony of E. Richard Larson); San
Francisco Hearing, supra, at 94-99 (Testimony of Morris Bailer). The ethical
problems were also raised. See Washington Hearing, supra, at 145-48 (Testimony
of E. Richard Larson); San Francisco Hearing, supra, at 94-99 (Testimony of Fred
Okrand), as well as concern about the effect of the Proposed Rule on civil rights
litigation in general. See San Francisco Hearing, supra, at 46-51 (Testimony of
Elizabeth D. Laporte); San Francisco Hearing, supra, at 77-79 (Testimony of Morris
Bailer).
316. For the text of the 1984 Proposed Rule, see supra note 315.
317. Id. The 1984 Proposed Rule and the commentary do not explain whether
"trial" means the date for which the trial is "set," the date when proof actually
begins to be offered, or some other point in time. See supra note 17, at 746.
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purpose for leaving the offer open for such an extended period of
time is to allow the offeree time to evaluate the offer and to conduct
any necessary discovery.3 8 The effect of these changes, however,
would be to reduce the utility of Rule 68. A defendant who makes
a serious Rule 68 offer usually does so based upon an assessment
of the risks of a bad result and the costs in fees and inconvenience
of continuing the litigation to an uncertain result. The offeree is
likely to try to compress as much discovery into the sixty days as
possible. If the offeree does this, the offeror will have to bear the
expense and inconvenience of the discovery, even though the offer
was made with the intent of avoiding such expense.
VII. Drawbacks of the Proposed Revisions
Both proposed revisions allow plaintiffs, as well as defendants,
to make offers,3t 9 and provide for an extended discovery period
during which the offer remains open. However, plaintiffs and defend-
ants have radically different needs for information to assess such
offers. In most cases, a plaintiff confronted with an offer will
have the information readily at hand to assess what his damages
may be. However, a defendant confronted with an offer from a
plaintiff needs to assess whether the plaintiff can establish liability
at all, as well as what is a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's
damages, before he knows whether to settle for the amount of the
offer. Thus the lengthened periods provided in the proposed revisions
may be more time than most plaintiffs need to assess the offer and
less than most defendants need.
As with Rule 68 as it now exists and the 1983 Proposal, the 1984
Proposal contemplates offers of non-monetary relief.320 It, too, fails
to provide guidelines as to how such offers are to be compared
with the relief ultimately obtained.
The main problem with the 1984 Proposed Revision is that it
provides for so much discretion that it makes Rule 68 not only
useless, but dangerous as well. The 1984 Proposed Revision is dis-
cretionary as to when the Rule is triggered, whether a sanction will
be imposed and what, if anything, that sanction will be.32' If the
318. The 1984 Proposed Revision, supra note 17, advisory committee note at
432.
319. Id. at 432; supra note 306.
320. The 1984 Proposed Revision, supra note 17, advisory committee note at
432.
321. Id. at 433; see supra note 315.
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present Rule 68, which is relatively clear on these points, is un-
derutilized, the uncertainty as to the benefits to be gained under
the 1984 Proposed Reyision is likely to result in the Rule not being
used at all.
Initially, it is unclear just what it takes to trigger the 1984 Revision.
This Proposed Revision provides that:
If, upon a motion by the offeror within 10 days after the entry
of judgment, the court determines that an offer was rejected
unreasonably, resulting in unnecessary delay and needless increase
in the cost of the litigation, it may impose an appropriate sanction
upon the offeree.122
If, for example, the offeree rejects a $50,000 offer at the beginning
of the litigation and recovers only $55,000 after years of expensive
litigation, the offeree has arguably rejected the offer unreasonably,
because the expenses of litigation probably resulted in a net recovery
of less than $50,000 in terms of the dollar values in existence at
the beginning of the suit. Conversely, an offeree who recovers slightly
less than the offer arguably has not rejected it unreasonably if all
the discovery had already been completed when the offer was made.
The 1984 Proposed Revision expressly requires the court to consider
at least six separate criteria in determining whether the Rule should
come into play, as well as "all of the relevant circumstances at the
time of the rejection, '3 23 an unclear direction at best. The six criteria
are:
(1) the then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim that
was the subject of the offer, (2) the closeness of the questions
of fact and law at issue, (3) whether the offeror had unreasonably
refused to furnish information necessary to evaluate the reason-
ableness of the offer, (4) whether the suit was in the nature of
a "test case," presenting questions of far-reaching importance
affecting non-parties, (5) the relief that might reasonably have
been expected if the claimant should prevail, and (6) the amount
of the additional delay, cost, and expense that the offeror rea-
sonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be
prolonged. 32 4
Indeed, counsel only need look for the largest judgment achieved
in the country in a case of his type and then state that he believed
322. The 1984 Proposed Revision, supra note 17, advisory committee note at
433.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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his case was worth at least that much in order to evade the rule.
The 1984 revision contains risks for the offeree as well. To properly
determine whether the offer was rejected unreasonably the court
would probably need to conduct a collateral litigation and inquire
into exactly what the offeree and his counsel reasonably thought at
the time of the rejection. This is likely to require discovery of
otherwise privileged documents and confidences, depositions of both
client and counsel and, possibly, a full blown hearing.
Assuming that the offeror is successful in fighting his way through
all these barriers and persuading the court that the rejection was
'unreasonable," there is no certainty that the reward would be
worth the effort. Just as there is discretion in determining whether
the Rule applies, there is discretion in determining what "sanction"
will be imposed. While the sanction might include an award to the
offeror of his fees accruing after the offer, it apparently would not
have the Marek effect of cutting off the offeree's fees where they
are recoverable by statute.325 Nevertheless, it might shift the offeror's
fees to the offeree or result merely in a "slap on the wrist" of
the offeree. The effect of all this discretion would likely be to
emasculate Rule 68 because it fails to provide any certainty in the
use of the Rule.
Rather than extensively revising Rule 68 just when it is becoming
known to the Bar and when its sanctions are becoming significant,
it would be wiser to make some minor technical changes in the Rule
to alleviate potential problems and then to evaluate the Rule's operation
over the next, few years.3 26 One necessary change would be to provide
some specific means of applying the Rule to class actions rather
than providing that the Rules would not apply to class actions, as
did both the 1983 and 1984 Proposed Revisions. 32 7
325. The commentary states:
Nothing in the rule affects the court's statutory authority to award
attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in certain types of cases .... Rule
68 implements an entirely different policy-encouraging settlements at
the earliest possible time-by imposing a sanction on conduct that is
found to be unreasonable and that results in unnecessary delay or needless
increase in litigation costs.
Id. at 436.
326. It appears unlikely that the 1984 Proposed Revision will be enacted in the
near future. The 1984 Proposed Revision is not scheduled to go before the Advisory
Committee until April, 1986. Should the Advisory Committee refer it to the Statutory
Committee, it is unlikely that it could do so within 1986 due to the time constraints
involved. Telephone interview with Professor Maurice Rosenberg, Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law, Member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (January
21, 1986).
327. In Gay v. Waiters & Dairy Lunchmen's Union Local No. 30, 86 F.R.D.
19861
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
While it is probably fair to extend the ten day period for con-
sideration of the offer, the proposed periods may be too long. A
better procedure would be to lengthen the period of the offer to
twenty days and allow a party to apply to the court for an extension.
The party would have to show why more time is necessary to evaluate
the offer and what specific discovery is needed to evaluate it. The
opposing party would then have to demonstrate a prejudicial effect
from such an extension. A useful revision would also provide the
courts with guidance in comparing non-monetary offers with non-
monetary recovery and to clarify other minor technical matters such
as the last date on which such an offer can be made. These types
of changes would leave the present rule fundamentally intact.
VIII. Conclusion
The proliferation of statutes awarding legal fees and the escalation
of the amount of the fee awards represent a significant departure
from the "American Rule.""32 The ready invocation of Rule 68 is
500 (N.D. Cal. 1980), the court ruled that Rule 68 could not properly be applied
to class actions. The court noted that, due to the difficulty of recovering costs
from the entire class, the class representative would become liable for the entire
amount of costs should the judgment exceed the offer. This would force the class
representative to "balance his personal liability for costs against the prospects of
sharing with the class in any recovery." Id. at 502-03. In addition, under Rule
23(e) class action settlements must be approved by the court; it would be inherently
unfair to impose costs upon the class representative where the court prevented the
acceptance of an offer. Id. at 503. The court further noted that the mechanics of
notification of class members could not be completed within the ten day period.
Id.
The Gay court's objections have been followed by the commentators. See Bran-
ham, supra note 110, at 360-62; Offer of Judgment in a Title VII Suit, supra note
100, at 337; A Fundamental Incompatibility, supra note 58, at 995-96.
Despite the case's conclusion that Rule 68 does not apply to class actions, three
courts have assessed offers made in complicated class actions. See supra notes 45-
59 and accompanying text. This suggests that something similar to Rule 68 can
be useful in these types of cases to provide some incentive to the parties to settle.
One solution would be to hold that Rule 68 is not applicable to class actions, but
to follow Justice Brennan's suggestion in the dissent to Marek that the plaintiff's
"unreasonable" rejection of a Rule 68 offer might provide the basis for reducing
the plaintiff's fee award. Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3032-34 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Branham, supra note 110, at 362. Another solution would be
to provide specific mechanisms in the Rule for its operation in class action cases.
These would include keeping the offer open until the court has an opportunity to
accept or reject the proposed settlement, providing that the sanctions of the Rule
do not fall solely on the class representative and providing the court with some
discretion in the application of the Rule to class actions. The present Rule is clearly
an awkward fit with class action litigation and, as Rule 68 becomes more commonly
used, change in this area will become imperative.
328. See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text.
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an appropriate response to this shift. As interpreted by the Marek
Court, Rule 68 protects defendants from the imposition of fee awards
under numerous statutes. The effect will be to encourage defendants
to routinely make settlement offers in the form of Rule 68 offers.
The possible sanctions under Rule 68 provide the plaintiff with
strong incentive to consider seriously the defendant's settlement offer
In addition, the increased use of the Rule is likely to encourage
defendants to make offers they otherwise might not make. This
result serves the best interests of the litigants and of a burdened
judiciary. After nearly fifty years, Rule 68 is finally beginning to
fulfill the role intended for it by the drafters of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Addendum
On April 21, 1986, while this issue was going to press, the Supreme
Court ruled, in Evans v. Jeff D.,11' that the Fees Act does not bar
either simultaneous negotiation of liability on the merits and fees" °
or a conditional offer in which the defendant asks the plaintiff to
waive fees in exchange for a settlement on the merits."' The Court
also held that it is the party rather than the attorney who has the
statutory eligibility for the fee award332 thereby strongly indicating
that in comparing the "judgment finally obtained by the offeree" 333
with the amount of a Rule 68 offer that the fees accrued to the
date of the offer must be totalled together with the plaintiff's recovery
on the merits.334
329. 54 U.S.L.W. 4359 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1986). For a discussion of the propriety
of prejudgment fee negotiation, see supra notes 198-217 and accompanying text.
330. Evans v. Jeff D., 54 U.S.L.W. at 4365 n.30. The Court thus rejected the
prohibition on such negotiation imposed by Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557
F.2d at 1020-21, and its progeny.
331. Evans v. Jeff D., 54 U.S.L.W. at 4362-66. The Court's conclusion was
based, in part on Marek v. Chesny. Id. at 4363 (quoting Marek v. Chesny, 105
S. Ct. at 3017-18).
332. Evans v. Jeff D., 54 U.S.L.W. at 4363 n.14.
333. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
334. See supra note 44 (comparing offers and judgments).
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